Where are the red lines for Russia?
Eric Witte August 11th, 2008
As Russia pushes its ground forces into central Georgia, it’s not clear what its ultimate goals are. According to Washington, Russia has made clear that it seeks to remove Mikheil Saakashvili. Will Moscow stop there? There’s a distinct danger that Vladimir Putin (and it seems fairly clear in all of this that from his prime minister’s perch, he’s still calling the shots) could try to move beyond sidelining the pro-western leadership of Georgia and look for a reason to turn on Ukraine. For the West so far, it’s not clear what exactly can be done about Georgia without risking war with Russia. The U.S. may try to fly back the 2,000 Georgian troops in Iraq, but what difference would that make - assuming Russia even allows the transport flight to land? Russia will have 2,000 more targets: not much more than a speed bump.
Looking past Georgia, perhaps NATO should think ahead and establish a clear red line with regard to Ukraine. That way, it is Russia that would have to actively risk militarily provoking the West in order to expand the war into Ukraine, not the West having to decide following a potential Russian assault on Ukraine whether it wants to actively risk war with Russia.
This wouldn’t do anything for Georgia, but could help to avoid worst-case scenarios.
[…] goals remain within his grasp. The second commitment is only verbal absent other actions, but, as I wrote earlier, at least with regard to Ukraine, could actually be helpful in defining its sovereignty as a red […]
But where would that red line be drawn? On the eastern border of Ukraine, or right down the middle of the country between where the pro and anti-Russian Ukrainians are?
Eric,
The red line should apply to Ukraine’s recognized international borders. Why should it be otherwise?
Eric Witte