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On October 1, the Clingendael Institute in The Hague and DPC hosted a policy roundtable entitled “The Future of International Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is the Strategy?,” involving policymakers from PIC members and policy analysts from Europe and North America.  It readily became that there was no strategy.  Two months later, the ill-planned and -executed “Butmir process,” announced on October 2nd, has collapsed.  The

The authors of the summary, Clingendael’s Marianne Rogier, the University of Amsterdam’s Maja Nenadovic, my colleague Bodo Weber and myself, also added a postscript to the summary, which I paste in its entirety below.

Postscript by the Authors

The round-table failed to produce concrete recommendations to be put forward to the next PIC meeting as initially envisaged by the organisers. However, we would like to seize the opportunity of this report to issue our own assessment of the current situation, taking into account the recently launched “Butmir process” and the last PIC steering board meeting in the form of a post-script. The following only represents the views if the authors of this report, and not the opinions expressed by the 1st October roundtable participants.

- The Dayton instruments, an executive OHR and operational Chapter VII EUFOR, must remain until BiH’s constitutional and governance structure has evolved to the point they are no longer required. There is no expiration date. Furthermore, these instruments should be used as needed. Since their credibility has been allowed to diminish, it may be necessary to resort to them to show BiH actors that the will is still there to use them.

- There is a clear necessity to differentiate the role of the High Representative from the EUSR. Both functions have different goals and require different tools to fulfil them. The OHR will remain until Bosnia shows itself consistently capable of functioning and reforming itself in the interest of its citizens. This is of particular importance at a time when attempts are being made against the territorial integrity of the state. The EUSR’s role is to support Bosnia’s EU integration process. Hopefully, both processes are self-reinforcing ones, and should go in parallel. We firmly believe that they should not be sequenced: Bosnia may still need the OHR while progressing on the European path. Both instruments may have to be reinforced, but not at the expense of each other. Furthermore, we believe that further clarification is needed on what type of mandate and power a “reinforced EUSR” will have. The EU is currently reorganising its foreign policy under the new Lisbon Treaty, and will have to come up with concrete proposals on what role it foresees for the EUSR in Bosnia.

- We note that the “5+ 2″ approach has been reaffirmed by the November meeting of the PIC Steering Board as the hurdle for OHR’s closure. We agree that no action to close the OHR should be undertaken so long as those conditions have not been fulfilled. We urge the PIC steering board members to hold this line, and not hollow-out these conditions for expediency’s sake, as has been the case with international conditionality with BiH before.

- International engagement must continue to achieve meaningful constitutional and governance reform, but should expand beyond the standard “let’s make a deal” approach with local political leaders. There needs to be a much more sustained, concerted effort to engage citizens directly on these issues in order to apply pressure from below on what amount to oligarchic and unrepresentative structures. The Bosnian population needs assurance that the country will not be allowed to dissolve, and nor will the necessary constitutional and governance reform be undertaken without popular consent. The EU and NATO also need to clarify what types of structural changes would need to be seen implemented (beyond the standard acquis communautaire) to achieve BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

In addition to these specific points, we would like to stress our deep concern regarding the current deteriorating situation in Bosnia and the lack of adequate response by the international community. We are profoundly worried at the indications that some wish to see the country partitioned, and fear that they might feel encouraged by the appeasing attitude advocated by some EU states. Have we forgotten that the main war aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to detach Republika Srpska from the rest of the country? If this is allowed 14 years after Dayton, after unprecedented international investment of political, human and financial capital to reconstruct a multiethnic, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, this would constitute an admission of ignominious defeat. Such a policy would reward ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the heart of Europe and with the support of the European Union. Is this the message that we want to send to future generations and to the world ridden with other secessionist conflicts? Can the EU’s still nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy afford such a resounding failure on its own doorstep?

Bosnia can not be compared to Kosovo or Montenegro. There is no valid argument, either political or legal, to support Republika Srpska’s independence. Furthermore, such a process would not be a peaceful one: it would most certainly throw the whole region back into conflict and instability. It is thus time to take a resolute stand to protect the peace that we have been building in the past 14 years, to protect the values for which the European Union stands, and to avoid any further conflicts in the region.

Sarajevo, The Hague, Amsterdam, Hanover, 27 November 2009.

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