DPC op-ed calls for no-fly zone over Darfur

Kurt Bassuener March 6th, 2009

Yesterday’s Washington Post published an op-ed by retired US Air Force Chief of Staff and former Obama campaign co-chair Gen. Merrill A. “Tony” McPeak and DPC Senior Associate Kurt Bassuener calling for the US to work together with its European allies to establish a no-fly zone over Darfur.  The article followed on the International Criminal Court’s issue of a warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s arrest for war crimes and crimes against humanity:

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President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice have all advocated a more engaged and effective policy to end the suffering in Darfur. They have also agreed that creating a no-fly zone over the region would change the dynamic on the ground.

…

By taking away the Sudanese government’s freedom to use air power to terrorize its population, the West would finally get enough leverage with Khartoum to negotiate the entry of a stronger U.N. ground force. Effective military action in the form of a no-fly zone would not preclude a political resolution, as some suggest, but in fact would make diplomacy more effective by reducing Bashir’s options.

Bashir has strung the international community along in a way that the late Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic would have envied. A no-fly zone is the best way to turn the conflict to his disadvantage. President Obama has vowed to act multilaterally, where possible, to build real, consensus solutions to international security problems. Decisive international action in Darfur may present the best opportunity to demonstrate this resolve.

The article’s argument was endorsed by New York Times columnist and persistent Darfur advocate Nicholas Kristof in his blog yesterday.

Darfur no-fly zone flies again?

Kurt Bassuener October 4th, 2008

As Eric and I have written repeatedly individually and separately for over four years (see the publications on the topic under the DPC banner in the European Voice, Wall Street Journal Europe and the International Herald Tribune), a no-fly zone operated by NATO from bases in Chad could change the dynamic on the ground in Darfur, where Sudanese forces and their auxiliary Janjaweed militia act with impunity, backed by Sudanese airpower.  Last summer the idea had considerable momentum, being supported by both Republicans and Democrats in the race for the White House. 

Then something happened - activists who had written a book on Darfur, “A Short History of a Long War,” Alex de Waal and Julie Flint, came out hard against the idea, stating that it would lead to a cut-off in humanitarian aid and undercut attempts to reach peace, and even subvert the north-south peace deal.  These arguments were reminiscent of those made against forceful intervention in Bosnia circa 1993 and 1994.  And they worked for some years, unfortunately.  In Darfur’s case, the wind went out of the sails of the idea, and it vanished below the radar for the past year. 

The ENOUGH coalition which has worked assiduously to end the genocide didn’t propose a real alternative when it came out against no-fly, giving equal weight to the opinion of a former US Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Merrill “Tony” McPeak, who explained how it could be done, and the EU’s chief of military staff, Gen. Henri Bantegeat, a ground commander, who said it was impossible.   Instead they supported monitoring Sudanese flights and attempting to shame them.

In the intervening year, the situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate.

Last night, thanks to a question by moderator Gwen Ifill in the vice presidential debate between Governor Sarah Palin and Senator Joe Biden, we now know that the no-fly zone proposal appears to have support on both tickets.  The relevant segment of the debate’s transcript can be accessed here, but below is an excerpt:

Ifill: Senator, you have quite a record, this is the next question here, of being an interventionist. You argued for intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, initially in Iraq and Pakistan and now in Darfur, putting U.S. troops on the ground. Boots on the ground. Is this something the American public has the stomach for?

Biden: Yes…I don’t have the stomach for genocide when it comes to Darfur. We can now impose a no-fly zone. It’s within our capacity. We can lead NATO if we’re willing to take a hard stand. We can; I’ve been in those camps in Chad. I’ve seen the suffering, thousands and tens of thousands have died and are dying. We should rally the world to act and demonstrate it by our own movement to provide the helicopters to get the 21,000 forces of the African Union in there now to stop this genocide.

 

Palin:  But as for as Darfur, we can agree on that also, the support of the no-fly zone, making sure that all options are on the table there also…America is in a position to help.

Biden has long been a proponent of a Darfur no-fly zone, and was passionate in last year’s Democratic debates on the issue.  He receives an A+ rating from darfurscores.org.   

 

Palin added that as Alaska Governor, she pressed for legislation to ensure the public sector of the state was divested of all business links to Sudan, which is laudable.

 

There is perhaps no more opportune time than now to press forward on the Darfur no-fly proposal, given that the UN/AU Mission in Darfur’s (UNAMID’s) aircraft have come under fire by rebels who believe they are Sudanese aircraft, which are also painted white to mimic the UN and humanitarian aircraft.  Not only has this increased the danger for UN/AU forces, but it has restricted aid distribution:

Aid groups said any further attacks on aircraft in Darfur could have a devastating impact on their work.

“No one wants to use the roads because they keep being shot at,” said Alun McDonald, spokesman for Oxfam in Sudan. “If they are starting to shoot at helicopters now, that doesn’t leave us with many options.”

And what was a major reason Ms. Flint, Mr. de Waal, and many humanitarian aid organizations resisted the no-fly zone?  Humanitarian access… The other main reason - space for peace talks - has also proven empty.  Nothing of consequence has been agreed, and no such agreement is on the horizon, as Bashir sees no reason to relent.  He has bent the international community to his will in a way that would make Milosevic jealous.

 

I hope that Senators Obama and McCain will follow the lead of their running mates and return to advocating the Darfur no-fly zone.  For if they both do so, then the necessary European - particularly French, as they have the bases needed to mount an air operation with fighter aircraft - cooperation needed can finally start to be mobilized.

ICC indictment an incentive for peace in Abyei?

Eric Witte August 9th, 2008

The government in Khartoum has agreed to a power-sharing deal in the disputed region of Abyei.  A member of the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement is to serve as administrator of the oil-rich area, with a local pro-Khartoum Arab to serve as his deputy. 

Assuming this deal holds (and past agreements haven’t, so don’t hold your breath), one wonders whether Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir hasn’t entered the compromise in order to strengthen the case that he’s an indispensible guarantor of peace with the south.  A settlement in disputed Abyei could serve to dampen international enthusiasm to see al-Bashir handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if ICC judges approve the prosecutor’s request for Darfur-related charges of genocide against him.  In any case, the possibility should be considered in the larger debate over whether peace and justice are at odds in Sudan.

Genocide charges against Bashir: justice and peace in Sudan

Eric Witte July 11th, 2008

The Washington Post is reporting this morning that on Monday, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court will seek Darfur-related charges of genocide and crimes against humanity against Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The United Nations is grappling with how the Sudanese regime might react, including by possibly targeting peacekeepers or cutting off their supplies. Likewise, humanitarian aid organizations worry about their access to people in need being cut off.

These are serious concerns, as is the major question examined in today’s New York Times about how the charges (there is no formal “indictment” at the ICC) could affect the tenuous north-south peace and what remains of the peace process in Darfur.

In different contexts, this is the same question that surrounded the indictments of Serbian and Liberian presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1999 and Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2003, respectively. A major after-effect of those indictments was to make the rule of Milosevic and Taylor no longer tenable, and diminished their ability to string along negotiators ad infinitum

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as suited their power interests. Thus, Milosevic was no longer able to wine and dine Richard Holbrooke and maintain his position as the perceived go-to guy for stability in the Balkans. Likewise, the absurd merry-go-round of broken peace and cease-fire arrangements - interspersed by additional negotiations when Taylor felt pressure to regroup and re-arm - came to an abrupt end in Liberia following the unsealing of his war crimes indictment. In Serbia, this meant that Serbs saw their futures tied to that of a pariah. This helped to motivate the civic uprising that overthrew Milosevic after he tried to steal another round of elections in October 2000. In Liberia, it led to international demands that Taylor leave power and the country as an essential component of any peace deal.

The Milosevic and Taylor indictments also led to increased media and high-level political attention for the crises in Serbia and Liberia. In the New York Times piece linked above, Sudan expert Alex de Waal worries that “[Bashir] is prone to irrational outbursts and could respond in a very aggressive way.” That’s quite possible, and greater instability in the short term is a real danger.  But de Waal himself has a smart post up at the Africa Policy Forum blog, arguing that Sudan requires diplomatic attention at a higher order of magnitude. Charges against Bashir could not only create accountability for atrocities in Darfur, but bring increased political resources to bear on the Sudanese crises.  This could lead the international community beyond tactical crisis management, and into the realm of strategic thinking backed by requisite resources to forge a more durable peace.

What does the Comoros intervention say about the African Union?

Eric Witte March 30th, 2008

African Union (AU) peacekeeping in Sudan’s vast Darfur region has not gone well, hobbled by a lack of capacity, insufficient western support, and absent unity of purpose. By contrast, last week the organization was successful in intervening in the tiny Indian Ocean archipelago nation of Comoros. An AU military contingent joined Comoran government forces in prevailing against a small, poorly equipped rebel opponent. The rebel leader was successfully ousted, and may yet face justice in Comoros.

The low threshold of this military success casts doubt on its meaning for greater African ability to engage in peacemaking, peacekeeping and democratization exercises in more daunting contexts. But the strange mix of motives within the AU for intervention in the Comoros represents perhaps an even greater challenge in to future AU deployments in support of democratic governments.

A brief look at the context of the intervention helps in explaining some of the motives for intervention among various AU members.

Under the 2001 constitution, each of three Comoran islands (Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli) has its own president and broad autonomy; the three presidents are vice presidents in the Comoros Union. A federal presidency rotates among the islands every four years, and is currently held by Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi, a moderate Islamist from Anjouan educated in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, who was elected in May 2006.  Sambi’s election, deemed free and fair by international observers, represented the first peaceful transition of power in Comoros in 30 years.

The current crisis in Comoros

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began in May last year, when armed loyalists of Col. Mohamed Bacar seized the capital of Anjouan island ahead of sham elections (replete with self-printed ballots) that extended Bacar’s term as the island’s president. After the country’s constitutional court declared the Anjouan election invalid, Bacar’s forces shot and killed two Comoran government soldiers attempting to enforce the ruling.

Until 2001, Comoros had been one of the most unstable countries in Africa since independence from France in 1975. There had been at least 18 coups, several of which were launched by the French mercenary Bob Denard, and some of which were supported by the French government. France frowned on Comoran claims to the fourth main island in the archipelago, Mayotte. Mayotte remains under French administration in accordance with a 1974 referendum.

This week’s AU-Comoran invasion of Anjouan, following months of efforts to resolve the crisis by other means and numerous unheeded warnings to Bacar and his cronies, is a positive development for the fragile young democracy in Comoros. And, indeed, the government of Tanzania, which contributed 750 troops to the effort, has cited the need for truly democratic elections on Anjouan as a rationale for its participation.

But what of the motivations of Libya and Sudan, the other two AU participants in the military intervention? Their despotic regimes surely take no interest in defending democracy in Africa, much less setting a precedent for its spread.

Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi is today the leading proponent of Pan-Africanism on the continent. As I wrote in European Voice last July when Gaddafi was pressing AU heads of government to agree to political union at a summit in Accra:

“Gaddafi’s past stabs at Pan-African politics have included the training and arming of a West African warlord network including former Liberian President Charles Taylor, Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compoaré, and the notorious limb-amputating Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. Taylor currently faces a war crimes trial for his role in a plot that involved the export of Sierra Leone’s diamonds through Libya. From 1973 to 1987 Libya occupied a uranium-rich strip of Chad. In 2002 the Central African Republic’s teetering government rewarded Libyan military support with a 99-year concession for its gold, diamonds and suspected oil reserves.

In turn, Gaddafi has transformed Africa’s natural resources, including Libya’s own considerable oil wealth, into a lifeline for African dictators under pressure. It is no wonder that Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe was among those cheering the colonel in Accra.

If Africa were unified, Gaddafi would accurately represent the state of governance in most of its countries today: intolerant of political dissent, free media and minority groups, corrupt and afraid to submit to free and fair elections.”

Gaddafi likely saw three attractions in the Comoros intervention, in order of probable importance:

  • It provided a sense of momentum to the African Union, his preferred vehicle for African unity.
  • It ended any temptation that former colonial power France might have to intervene.
  • Gaddafi can now likely count on political support from a grateful Comoran government (limited in its weight as it is) for his ambitions to lead the Pan-African project.

Sudan’s regime contributed 150 troops to the Comoros intervention.  Khartoum has long been engaged in a series of conflicts pitting desire for central control of power and resources against resistance to this on the peripheries of the vast country.  As the International Crisis Group has extensively reported, in addition to the North-South conflict and Darfur, this dynamic applies to Khartoum’s conflicts in Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile.

In the case of Darfur, the underpowered AU observation/peacekeeping force long served the Sudanese government as a shield to stave off introduction of a potentially more potent UN or even NATO force.

So for Khartoum, the Comoros intervention was likely attractive because it:

  • came to the aid of a central government asserting control over a rebellious federal unit;
  • and strengthened the perception of the AU as a credible alternative intervention force in Africa, which may undercut the perceived legitimacy of future interventions on the continent by non-African forces, even those operating under a United Nations umbrella.

There is certainly nothing bad per se about a desire to see enhanced AU unity and operational capacity. But there seems to be a fundamental divide between African democrats and despots with regard to what the AU should be, and what ends its operations should serve. The AU could use added capacity to protect democratic governments from insurgent warlords and would-be dictators, or it could serve interventions in support of leaders who happen to be favored by powerful AU leaders, and occasionally as a political shield to prevent external intervention in the worst of the continent’s politically induced calamities.

Rarely are these visions likely to overlap and create the requisite impetus for action, as they did this past week in Comoros.