Kurt Bassuener March 9th, 2010

In the February edition of the German foreign policy journal Internationale Politik’s English version, IP Global, Bodo Weber and I have written “Balkan Tango - The EU’s disjointed policies compound Bosnia’s paralysis.” In it, we argue that the international community’s policies toward Bosnia - and the EU’s in particular - are in disarray and without a strategic goal or plan.  This has accelerated Bosnia’s downward slide, which began four years ago.  To get out of this dynamic, we argue that the United States must first shift its own policy and make an effort to develop a coalition within the EU to restablilize the country, and then develop a more long-term approach.  We believe getting Germany onside is essential to developing critical mass within the EU.

The most recent Peace Implementation Council Steering Board meeting on Feb 24-25 (see the PIC Communique here) wasn’t encouraging from that persepective.  The issue of a referendum by the Republika Srpska didn’t even rate a mention in the communique, since doing so would mean a Russian footnote.  For some continental EU members, Germany prominent among them, maintaining consensus was more important that drawing the line…

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Iryna Chupryna February 19th, 2010

On February 7, 2010, the former heroine of the Orange Revolution and the current prime minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, and the opposition leader who was defeated in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, competed in the second round of the presidential run-off took place in Ukraine. In the first round, Yanukovych won over Tymoshenko with the 10 percent lead (35.32 % and 25.05 % of votes). Till the very last moment the intrigue shaped the election campaign – will Tymoshenko manage to reduce the gap and even win? But the miracle did not happen. The prime minister whom many blame for the severe economic crisis in Ukraine fell short of the victory. She received 45.47 % of votes, while Viktor Yanukovych – 48. 95%. Tymoshenko made a remarkable progress compared to the first round gaining additional 20 % of votes, but this was not enough for realizing her dream.

The first post-Orange presidential elections in Ukraine were marked by some salient trends exposing the disappointment of Ukrainian voters that replaced the enthusiasm and idealism of the participants of the Orange Revolution in 2004. Namely, the turnout in the run-off was only 69.07 percent. While a decent figure by Western standards, in Ukraine this has become the lowest level of electoral participation since the presidential elections in 1999 (in 1999 turnout was 73.8, in 2004 – 77,32 %). It cannot be ruled out that among more than 30 percent of voters who ignored the presidential race, the protest electorate represented a substantial share.

The high percentage of those who voted against the two candidates (there is a legal option to vote “against all” in a ballot) - 4.36 percent, - is definitely an even more convincing evidence of the growing disappointment with two main contenders for presidency. It is peculiar that although Tymoshenko lost to Yanukovych in view of general number of votes in her support, she won in more regions. She took the lead in 16 regions and in Kyiv, while Yanukovych – in 8 regions of Ukraine, as well as in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. This is explained by the fact that southern and eastern regions where Yanukovych won are more densely populated than the western ones.

Why did Tymoshenko lose to Yanukovych who is less eloquent, attractive and steadfast politician, who was twice criminally convicted before? The reason is probably that she managed to alienate many of voters in the Western and Central Ukraine that was a stronghold for Yuschenko and “orange” political forces. In 2009, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (ByUT) together with the Party of Regions developed a constitutional reform project that was aimed to share the power in the country between only two political forces and to exclude any other, but the project failed due to the unwillingness of Yanukovych to become a figurehead president. In August 2008, Tymoshenko did not protest against the Russia’s aggression towards Georgia. She was responsible for the new gas contracts with Russia that proved to be very disadvantageous to Ukraine and contributed to the huge growth of state’s debt. As a prime minister, Tymoshenko could hardly find an efficient strategy to cope with the economic and financial crisis. All those factors severely undermined her credibility even among her former supporters. In contrast, being in the opposition, Yanukovych has a better position than the Tymoshenko.

If we look at the election results on the map of Ukraine, it becomes evident that the clear electoral divide of the country between the “orange” West and Center and the “blue” East and South has remained largely unchanged since the elections in 2004. There are only two differences. First, the “orange” team was represented this time by Yulia Tymoshenko instead of Viktor Yuschenko, and the second, Yanukovych managed to gain more votes in central regions of Ukraine compared to 2004, and that secured victory for him.The territorial political divide of Ukraine is hardly a positive signal. It means that none of influential Ukrainian politicians in last five years in Ukraine managed to become a genuine national leader uniting Ukraine’s East and West. However, Sergiy Tyhipko and Arseniy Yatseniuk who finished third and fourth in the first election round demonstrated nearly equal support in different regions in Ukraine. Those promising politicians can in the future become the leaders who are able to overcome the notorious Ukraine’s divide. If Viktor Yanukovych manages to recruit them in his team, he would make a wise step, since the country’s political divide remains one of the main reasons for chronic political instability in Ukraine along with flawed constitutional and electoral reforms.

As expected, Yulia Tymoshenko did not recognize her defeat in the run-off and appealed against election results in the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine. Still most political analysts agree that if successful she may be able to change the final result up to 1%, but Yanukovych is a legitimate winner of the presidential race.Before the elections, Tymoshenko threatened to take people to the streets if the elections are stolen. But she didn’t dare to stage street protests, since, in contrast to 2004, all domestic and international observers claimed that the elections were free and fair and met international standards. In particular, the election conduct was praised by the OSCE-ODIHR observation mission and the largest Ukrainian election observation NGO, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine.

If Tymoshenko decided to destabilize the situation in Ukraine claiming that she was the genuine elected President, she would have seriously undermined her image, especially after the recognition of election results by world leaders, including U.S. President, Barack Obama.  It is remarkable that for almost a week after the election date she did not make any public appearance.At the moment, the most important challenge for the newly elected President is to form a new viable coalition in the parliament. The currently existing coalition between the Our Ukraine –People’s Self-Defense Bloc, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) and the Lytvyn Bloc has less MPs e than it is needed for the majority, and lately most of the voting was situational and based on momentary  interests of different political factions. It is very likely that Yanukovych will urge upon the formation of a new coalition that is viable and loyal to him that would include Party of Regions, Communists, Lytvyn Bloc. But in order to form a majority the coalition needs to include MPs from Our Ukraine who have been perceived as official political rivals so far. If the Party of Regions fails to form such a coalition, this may lead to pre-term parliamentary elections. But taking into account the emergence of new political “tigers” such as Arseniy Yatseniuk and Sergiy Tyhypko, who both already launched their own political party projects, the new election may weaken the representation of the Party of Regions in power and, therefore, is better to be avoided by the new President.If Yanukovych manages to reformat the ruling coalition in the parliament and to put in place a new loyal prime minister, he will have much more comfortable situation than one of the President Yuschenko whose relations with the premier Tymoshenko were hostile. He will definitely have an opportunity to consolidate his power, and only time will show whether or not this will be accompanied by the attacks on democracy or not.

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Kurt Bassuener December 10th, 2009

Below is a sign-on letter addressed to HR Valentin Inzko, calling on him to impose the extension of international judges and prosecutors in the Court of BiH, whose terms expire on Dec 14th.  A number of Peace Implementation Council (PIC) members are resistant to such a move, fearing the reaction of the RS Premier Milorad Dodik.

Should these personnel NOT be extended, a number of investigations and cases would need to be re-started.  Furthermore, the viability of the Court of BiH may well be in question.  

The letter below, with former HR Christian Schwarz-Schilling and a number of European politicians, international justice professionals, civil society actors, and other concerned persons was conveyed to the High Representative today, and also sent to the attention of the PIC Ambassadors. 

Please note that a number of additional signatories have been added since the letter was initially delivered on Thursday afternoon.  These signatories, as of 1800 hrs Friday, 11 December, are integrated into the overall list.

Thursday, December 10, 2009

Dear High Representative Inzko,

The entrenchment of the Rule of Law has been a key focus of the international community’s postwar engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The inclusion of international judges and prosecutors in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, sitting in the special chambers for War Crimes and Organized Crime, are essential components in this effort, as the Chief Prosecutor and President of the Court attested to you and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board last month.  These professionals are required to complement the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the domestic struggle against organized crime and corruption. Should the international judges and prosecutors not have their mandates renewed by December 14^th, a number of ongoing cases will have to be restarted.  Years of effort toward ensuring justice will have been wasted.

More than half of the international personnel serving in the Court last year have left, uncertain that their contracts would be extended.  Domestic authorities have made no provisions to fund these positions or fill them with Bosnian and Herzegovinian professionals.  The result would not only affect a number of ongoing and pending cases in both chambers, but perhaps the viability of the Court of BiH itself.  That seems to be precisely the objective of a number of Bosnian politicians, who are wary of investigation and potential prosecution at the Court.  

We the undersigned wish to express our deep concern that most PIC Steering Board members are counseling against extension of these judges’ and prosecutors’ mandates for reasons of political convenience and expediency, wishing to avoid additional friction following the failed “Butmir process” of talks on constitutional reforms.  Such a stance not only threatens to undermine the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is politically shortsighted as well.  The political conflicts these PIC members hope to avoid will certainly occur in any case - after they have further weakened their own ability to address them by their clear failure to respond on this matter, which is widely recognized as pivotal.

As High Representative, you have the executive authority and moral responsibility to act to protect the Dayton Accords and the achievements of over a decade of efforts to entrench rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  On Human Rights Day, we believe the most significant action towards fulfilling that responsibility would be the imposition of the simple changes to the law that would extend the mandates of the international legal personnel at the State Court for an additional three years. We therefore urge you, in your capacity as High Representative, to take this step.

Sincerely,

SIGNATORIES

Former High Representatives

Dr. Wolfgang Petritsch 

Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling

International Parliamentarians/Politicians

Marieluise Beck, MP Bundestag, Bündnis90/Grüne, Berlin

Franziska Brantner, MEP, Group of Greens, European Free Alliance

Cem Özdemir, Co-Chair Bündnis90/Grüne

Jelko Kacin, MEP, Liberal Democracy Slovenia, ALDE Group

Diana Wallis, MEP, Liberal Democrats Party, ALDE Group

NGOs and Civil Society Organizations/Leaders

ACIPS, Sarajevo

Ahmet Alibasic, Lecturer, Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo

Kurt Bassuener, Democratization Policy Council, Sarajevo

Sonja Biserko, President, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia

Darko Brkan, CA Why not? (UG Zasto ne?), Movement Dosta!

Dr. Svetlana Broz, Director NGO GARIWO, Sarajevo 

Tobias Bütow, Schwarzkopf-Foundation Young Europe

Center for Advanced Studies, Sarajevo

Center for Civic Cooperation, Livno: Zulka Baljak, Managing Director, Kata Marijan Krzelj, Program Manager

Jelena Golubovic, Belgrade Center for Human Rights; Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada

Ljuljjeta Goranci Brkic, General Manager, Nansen Dialogue Center, Sarajevo

Mirela Grünther-Djecevic, Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, Head of country office for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo

John W. Heffernan, Director, Speak Truth To Power, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo

Jim Hooper, Managing Director, Public International Law and Policy Group, Washington, DC

Tim Hughes, former Head of Investigation and Verification Department, Independent Judicial Commission (IJC); Washington, DC

Valerie Hughes, Ireland Action for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dublin, Ireland

Human Rights Centre, University of Sarajevo.

Human Rights House of Sarajevo

Biljana Kovacevic-Vuco, Chairperson, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM), Belgrade

Branka Magas and Quintin Hoare, The Bosnian Institute, London

Alma Masic, Head of Office, Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Sarajevo

Dzenita Mehic Saracevic, Community of Bosnia

Andrej Nosov, Heartefact Fund, Belgrade

Zoran Pusic, president of the Civic Comittee for Human Rights, Zagreb

Philipp Ruch, Center for Political Beauty, Berlin

Vehid Sehic, President, Citizens’ Forum, Tuzla

Mirsad Tokaca, Director of the Research and Documentation Center (RDC), Sarajevo

Vesna Terselic, Director, DOCUMENTA - CENTRE FOR DEALING WITH THE PAST, Zagreb

Transparency International, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Peter Julian Walsh, Ireland Action for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greystones, Ireland

Bodo Weber, Democratization Policy Council, Berlin

Justice and Human Rights Professionals/Academia

Vlado Azinovic, Ph.D., School of Political Science, University of Sarajevo

Nina Bang-Jensen, Public International Law and Policy Group, Washington, DC

Annika Björkdahl, Associate Professor / Docent, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden

Tanya L. Domi, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Columbia University

Kelly M. Greenhill, Assistant Professor, Tufts University and Research Fellow, Harvard University

Tomasz Kamusella, Thomas Brown Lecturer, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

Jeremy Kinsman, former Canadian Ambassador and High Commissioner, currently Regents’ Lecturer, University of California, Berkeley

Dr. Zvonimir Kubinek, Chair of the Advisory Board, Missing Persons Institute, Sarajevo

Professor Noel Malcolm, Oxford University

Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, New York

Lara Nettelfield, Post Doctoral Fellow, Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals; Assistant Professor, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University Vancouver

Ambassador Mark Palmer, former US Ambassador to Hungary

Dr. Olga Martin-Ortega, Senior Research Fellow, Centre on Human Rights in Conflict
University of East London

Andras Riedlmayer, editor of International Justice Watch

Prof. Dzemal Sokolovic, Institute of Comparative Politics and Rokkan Center for Social Studies, University of Bergen, Norway

Professor Chandra Lekha Sriram
Chair in Human Rights and Director, Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, School of Law, University of East London

Iva Vukusic, Sense Agency, The Hague

Andrew Wachtel, Dean of the Graduate School, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA

Jon Western, Ph.D., Five College Associate Professor of International Relations Mount Holyoke College and the Five Colleges, Inc.

Concerned Individuals

Steve Albert, former editor of BosNet, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Neven Andjelic

Diego E. Arria, former Representative of Venezuela to the UN

Nidzara Beganovic, Sarajevo

Maja Drnda, Barcelona, Spain

Douglas Ebner

Rev. John Feighery, Dublin, Ireland

Marshall Harris, former State Dept official, Alstan and Bird LLC, Washington, DC

Ivana Howard, MA in Democracy and Human Rights in SEE, Sarajevo

Zlatko Hurtic (international development expert), Sarajevo

Senka Jahic, Berkeley, California ,USA

Raza Jahic Micic, Iteon consulting, San Francisco, California, US

Senada Kreso, Sarajevo

Selma Mustovic, New York City, USA

Sabrina Pryce

Prof. Inela Selimovic, St. Mary’s College, Notre Dame, Indiana, US

Conor Smith Gaffney, Chicago, Illinois, USA

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Kurt Bassuener December 3rd, 2009

On October 1, the Clingendael Institute in The Hague and DPC hosted a policy roundtable entitled “The Future of International Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is the Strategy?,” involving policymakers from PIC members and policy analysts from Europe and North America.  It readily became that there was no strategy.  Two months later, the ill-planned and -executed “Butmir process,” announced on October 2nd, has collapsed.  The Clingendael roundtable proceedings,  linked here as a PDF document, can give readers a sense of why these talks were doomed to failure as devised.

The authors of the summary, Clingendael’s Marianne Rogier, the University of Amsterdam’s Maja Nenadovic, my colleague Bodo Weber and myself, also added a postscript to the summary, which I paste in its entirety below.

Postscript by the Authors

The round-table failed to produce concrete recommendations to be put forward to the next PIC meeting as initially envisaged by the organisers. However, we would like to seize the opportunity of this report to issue our own assessment of the current situation, taking into account the recently launched “Butmir process” and the last PIC steering board meeting in the form of a post-script. The following only represents the views if the authors of this report, and not the opinions expressed by the 1st October roundtable participants.

- The Dayton instruments, an executive OHR and operational Chapter VII EUFOR, must remain until BiH’s constitutional and governance structure has evolved to the point they are no longer required. There is no expiration date. Furthermore, these instruments should be used as needed. Since their credibility has been allowed to diminish, it may be necessary to resort to them to show BiH actors that the will is still there to use them.

- There is a clear necessity to differentiate the role of the High Representative from the EUSR. Both functions have different goals and require different tools to fulfil them. The OHR will remain until Bosnia shows itself consistently capable of functioning and reforming itself in the interest of its citizens. This is of particular importance at a time when attempts are being made against the territorial integrity of the state. The EUSR’s role is to support Bosnia’s EU integration process. Hopefully, both processes are self-reinforcing ones, and should go in parallel. We firmly believe that they should not be sequenced: Bosnia may still need the OHR while progressing on the European path. Both instruments may have to be reinforced, but not at the expense of each other. Furthermore, we believe that further clarification is needed on what type of mandate and power a “reinforced EUSR” will have. The EU is currently reorganising its foreign policy under the new Lisbon Treaty, and will have to come up with concrete proposals on what role it foresees for the EUSR in Bosnia.

- We note that the “5+ 2″ approach has been reaffirmed by the November meeting of the PIC Steering Board as the hurdle for OHR’s closure. We agree that no action to close the OHR should be undertaken so long as those conditions have not been fulfilled. We urge the PIC steering board members to hold this line, and not hollow-out these conditions for expediency’s sake, as has been the case with international conditionality with BiH before.

- International engagement must continue to achieve meaningful constitutional and governance reform, but should expand beyond the standard “let’s make a deal” approach with local political leaders. There needs to be a much more sustained, concerted effort to engage citizens directly on these issues in order to apply pressure from below on what amount to oligarchic and unrepresentative structures. The Bosnian population needs assurance that the country will not be allowed to dissolve, and nor will the necessary constitutional and governance reform be undertaken without popular consent. The EU and NATO also need to clarify what types of structural changes would need to be seen implemented (beyond the standard acquis communautaire) to achieve BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

In addition to these specific points, we would like to stress our deep concern regarding the current deteriorating situation in Bosnia and the lack of adequate response by the international community. We are profoundly worried at the indications that some wish to see the country partitioned, and fear that they might feel encouraged by the appeasing attitude advocated by some EU states. Have we forgotten that the main war aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to detach Republika Srpska from the rest of the country? If this is allowed 14 years after Dayton, after unprecedented international investment of political, human and financial capital to reconstruct a multiethnic, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, this would constitute an admission of ignominious defeat. Such a policy would reward ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the heart of Europe and with the support of the European Union. Is this the message that we want to send to future generations and to the world ridden with other secessionist conflicts? Can the EU’s still nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy afford such a resounding failure on its own doorstep?

Bosnia can not be compared to Kosovo or Montenegro. There is no valid argument, either political or legal, to support Republika Srpska’s independence. Furthermore, such a process would not be a peaceful one: it would most certainly throw the whole region back into conflict and instability. It is thus time to take a resolute stand to protect the peace that we have been building in the past 14 years, to protect the values for which the European Union stands, and to avoid any further conflicts in the region.

Sarajevo, The Hague, Amsterdam, Hanover, 27 November 2009.

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Bodo Weber December 1st, 2009

On December 1st, Balkan Insight published an OpEd by DPC Senior Associate Bodo Weber, a reaction to a comment by Mathew Parish (Balkan Insight, November 19th), former chief legal adviser to the Brcko district mediator Robert Owen, in which Parish calls the disintegration of the Bosnian state “inevitable” and advises the international community to start mediating a peaceful way to Republika Srpska’s independence. Bodo Weber in his reaction explains why Bosnia’s disintegration is far from being inevitable and why it could not proceed peacefully. With the ill-designed Butmir talks having obviously failed which both the EU and the US have entered without a Plan B, Weber argues, talk of partition as “inevitable” is nevertheless in danger of becoming an attractive excuse for the International community to make a speedy exit from Bosnia’s current stalemate. You can read the full article here.

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Kurt Bassuener November 18th, 2009

On Monday, the online journal Global Europe published an op-ed by DPC Senior Associates Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener calling for German and American leadership on Bosnia policy.  Among the recommendations was the separation of the High Representative, who has a peace enforcement role, from the EU Special Representative, who has an EU enlargement facilitation role.  The article notes the potential of Germany to lead the EU out of its current policy dead-end.

The full article can be found online here.

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Kurt Bassuener November 3rd, 2009

 (posted for Bodo Weber): 

The latest issue of the German weekly Die Zeit, published last week, carries an op-ed by me in which I argue that after the failure of the “Butmir process” initiated by  the EU’s Swedish Presidency it is time for the EU to finally take serious course in its policy towards Bosnia and that such a turn will demand Germany to take the lead. You can go to the link here for the article. An English version of the text is below.

Suddenly there is talk about war again

Die Zeit, 29.10.1009    Bodo Weber

This week the trial against Radovan Karadzic finally opened. Bosnia-Herzegovina may reach the soccer world championship in South Africa. And in all postwar countries of the former Yugoslavia, politics revolves around EU-integration. Sounds like successful calming and stabilization of Europe’s most recent theatre of war? Wrong.

High-level representatives of the European Union and the U.S. are currently en route to Bosnia-Herzegovina as crisis managers. For three and a half years ethnonationalistic rhetoric is escalating there and preventing political reform. For the first time in over a decade, the terms “war” and “violent conflict” have been resurrected in public debate. In this process Milorad Dodik, prime minister of the Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb entity in Bosnia is acting as the most vociferous agitator. He maintains an authoritarian regime with nationalistic populist speeches and regularly snubs the international community.

The international community had planned to stabilize the post-war state with the help of a semi-protectorate, but then initiated a phase-out. Its rationale: Over a decade after ending the war it was time for Bosnians and Herzegovinians to take over full responsibility for their country. From this view, the existence of international watchdogs is itself basically undemocratic. This putatively self-critical argumentation obscures two crucial problems: First, the international community wanted to get rid of the Bosnian problem child. And second, it wanted to hide the fact that at no point over the last fourteen post-war years has it developed a strategy for a long-term political stabilisation of the country without authoritarian international control.

One of the causes of the problems lies in the very Dayton-Agreement that secured the ending of the war in 1995. The Dayton post-war order has contained the aggressive effects of ethnic nationalism, it restored security and freedom of movement. The war armies have been dissolved, the military removed as a conflict factor.

But peace came at a special price: Instead of a functional Bosnian post-war state Dayton created a weak, dysfunctional and unsustainably expensive state; a complex state structure in which the constitution secures the decentralization of power and the predominance of ethnic political parties. At the same time, it sets hurdles too high for reaching substantial constitutional change from within, even though the majority of the population has long turned its back on the political elites.

The international community had tried to take corrective action through the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Its head was equipped with the authority to enforce laws or suspend them and to fire state officials whose ethnonationalistic policy and rhetoric represented a threat to Dayton. But this strengthening of the OHR was less motivated by the will to develop a real strategy for political stabilisation than by the wish to end the expensive and not very effective engagement in Bosnia in the foreseeable future.

When the U.S. took the Balkans off its top priority list after 9/11, the complete responsibility for the region fell to the EU. Without further ado, it declared the EU integration process to be the new statebuilding strategy. The High Representative additionally became the EU Special Representative for Bosnia. Europe put the EUFOR military mission in place for securing peace, thus turning Bosnia into one of the first test cases for its common European foreign and security policy. This sounded good – except for one shortfall: Brussels never had a strategic discussion on whether the prospect of EU membership could be a sufficient incentive for the local political elites in the southeast European countries (especially Bosnia) to take on the necessary economical and political reforms.

As the gap between the EU’s pretension and the Bosnian reality widened, “Bosnia-fatigue” inside the union grew. Instead of reacting politically Brussels turned on the bureaucratic autopilot and in 2006 decided to flee forward: The EU ascribed political maturity to the domestic elites and announced the imminent closure of the OHR. As the political elites’ zeal for reform vanished with the announcement of the pullout the EU dropped a central condition for signing an association agreement with Bosnia. The immediate consequences were: The expected reform dynamics did not take place. Two High Reps perished, the OHR sank into ineffectiveness. The EU lost the rest of its authority in Bosnia.

Brussels takes comfort in stating that the outbreak of a new war is unthinkable, if not for other reasons then because there do not exist ethnic armies any more. That is correct but still diverts from the real dangers. Bosnia lacks reliable state actors that could prevent an outbreak of violence.  Neither does there exist a de-politicized police nor a judiciary that could function in a way that guarantees the rule of law without external assistance. Without these instruments and a state monopoly on force, it is very realistic to imagine a local outbreak of violence as trivial as a clash between fans of two rivalling soccer teams to escalate into a regional ethnic conflict. And there is no lack of weapons in Bosnia even today.

Despite all that the EU remains politically motionless. Inside the union advocates of a harder approach (mainly Britain and the Netherlands) are standing vis-à-vis supporters of a softer course (lead by Sweden). But none of the European governments is prepared for a reinforced engagement in Bosnia. And yet the EU would neither need to reinvent the wheel nor invest additional resources. In Bosnia today, authoritarian-nationalistic forces are substantially weaker than they had been a few years ago. The recent political escalation is less the expression of a new strength of the political elites then of the power vacuum left over by the EU.

What then, should the EU do? It has to reengage. And it has to understand that both forceful interventions into the Bosnian sovereignty and the existing European military contingent will still be necessary through the course of the EU integration process. What is necessary is political will and a long-term perspective that will give the population security and curtail the elites’ space for manoeuvring and manipulation. With its current politics of ignorance, Europe risks generating considerably higher political costs in the long term.

Germany could take a leading role within the EU and thus bring the community back to a serious course in Bosnia. Both the emergence of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Germany’s pretension to become a global player are inseparably linked to the Srebrenica genocide and Europe’s failure in Bosnia. That should actually be motivation enough for Germany. It remains to be seen in the upcoming weeks and months whether the new conservative-liberal government is going to move away from the Bosnia-fatigue of its predecessor. It then also remains to be seen how big the discord between pretension and reality in the German foreign policy will be.

Bodo Weber is a Berlin-based Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council (DPC)

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Kurt Bassuener October 22nd, 2009

Today the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, the German Green Party’s political foundation, published a longer analysis of mine of the situation in Bosnia after the failed Butmir talks.  In this piece, I had a bit more room to map-out a potential way out of the current dead-end.  The article, “What next in Bosnia?,” is on Boell’s website at: http://www.boell.de/intlpolitics/europe-north-america-7682.html

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Kurt Bassuener October 22nd, 2009

Today’s issue of the weekly the European Voice carries an op-ed by me in which I argue that the “Butmir process” pursued for the past two weeks in Bosnia by the EU’s Swedish Presidency and the US has failed, and for a different approach: strengthening the Dayton instruments of OHR and EUFOR and extending them until Bosnia undergoes sufficient constitutional reform to obviate the need for them.  You can go to the link here for the article.  The full text is below.

It is time for a Plan B for Bosnia
 
The international approach to Bosnia needs a strategic re-think.

For more than three years, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political situation has been deteriorating. Fears have re-surfaced that the state may violently collapse. The international community, without a strategy for years, has responded irresolutely.
 
The international community has now re-engaged, at least. On 10 October and again on 20-21 October, Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister, Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for enlargement, and Jim Steinberg, the US deputy secretary of state, called most of Bosnia’s political party leaders together at Butmir, outside Sarajevo, where they outlined a ‘package’ of reforms necessary, as they sold it, for deeper Euro-Atlantic integration.
 
The effort, though, has failed. Most Bosnian party leaders rejected the package. And there has been collateral damage: Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, called for his largely Serb-populated region to have the right to a referendum on independence. The Butmir process further weakened the international community’s high representative, Valentin Inzko, who was relegated to the sidelines.

This highlights one of the core problems in the EU’s current approach: its fixation on the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The EU’s Swedish presidency and many EU states believe Bosnia is a ‘protectorate’ as long as there is an OHR, the peace implementation body created by the Dayton peace accords. They are categorical that they cannot negotiate with Bosnia on further steps toward the EU until the OHR is closed.

As a result, the aim of the ‘Butmir process’ appears to be more to close the OHR than to halt Bosnia’s downward political spiral.

This poses tactical problems: while Bildt seems willing to give anything away to achieve that end, Dodik seems unwilling to give anything.

But the bigger issue is that the real criterion for closing the OHR should be whether Bosnia can function as a state without it. The European Commission has, to its credit, gone some way toward defining the EU’s demands by enumerating constitutional reforms needed for Bosnia to gain candidate status. NATO too should clarify its requirements.

But Bosnia’s politicians have long shown little willingness to expend political capital to meet EU and NATO standards, a response conditioned by years of the international community fudging its own standards to create the illusion of progress. Those habits will be hard for both sides to break.

Now that the Butmir effort has clearly failed, the entire international approach must be re-thought. What key elements should a Plan B contain?

First, it should be made clear that Dayton’s executive instruments – the OHR and the military side of peace implementation, EUFOR – will remain in place until Bosnia has undergone deep reform. A clear, open-ended commitment would signal to Bosnia’s politicians that they cannot simply wait out the international community.

The roles of OHR and EU Special Representative should not be occupied by the same person, as is the case now. Linking these missions at the top ensures a lowest common-denominator approach, with the EU attempting to veto the use of the extensive Bonn Powers that the OHR has.

The EU and NATO should approach constitutional reform strategically, by forming an international commission tasked with identifying popularly legitimate solutions for Bosnia’s governance.

The status of state (public) and military property, included in the five objectives and two conditions set for the OHR’s closure, must also be resolved.

International judges and prosecutors should remain involved in war-crimes and organised-crime cases beyond the end of this year. The OHR should impose a three-year extension.

Finally, the West needs to develop and demonstrate a long-term common strategy. This was clearly lacking at Butmir. The fact that Bildt can have such influence shows that few member states have firm policies. A US special envoy may need to be the catalyst for any common strategy, working with EU members that share Washington’s concerns, primarily the UK and the Netherlands. They and others in the EU that back a tougher approach now need to bring Germany on board.

Kurt Bassuener is a senior associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion.

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Kurt Bassuener October 6th, 2009

International Community Still Divided on Bosnia Strategy as Situation Deteriorates

The Hague, October 6:  The Clingendael Institute and the Democratization Policy Council on October 1 held an expert policy roundtable “The Future of International Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is the Strategy?” The aim of the meeting was to attempt to forge a coherent and strategic approach toward the deteriorating situation in Bosnia among members of the EU and NATO.

Participants included diplomats from EU member states, North America, and Turkey, as well as the European Union institutions, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), NATO, the OSCE, and other international organizations and policy experts from a variety of nongovernmental and academic institutions.
 
The political situation in Bosnia is deteriorating at an accelerating pace. Progress has not merely stalled on most fronts, but is actively being rolled back. All participants seemed to agree that the international community’s current collective policy approach is delivering diminishing returns. 

Yet deep fissures were evident, both between Europeans and North Americans and among EU members themselves, on what policy is required. Some advocate reinvigoration of the Dayton instruments, OHR and EUFOR. Others call for accelerating transition to a double-hatted EU Special Representative/Head of EC delegation.  Despite efforts to clarify what sort of Bosnia the international community collectively would like to see, and how to get there from here, these remained nebulous at the end of the roundtable.  There remains no long-term international strategy to ensure Bosnia’s stability and functionality. 

The organizers will publish a summary report on the roundtable’s proceedings well before the November Peace Implementation Council Steering Board meeting. It will be posted on both the Clingendael and DPC websites.

For media inquiries, please contact:

Marianne Rogier, Senior Fellow, Clingendael Institute (+31 70 374 6692, mrogier@clingendael.nl)

Kurt Bassuener, Senior Associate, Democratization Policy Council (+387 61 489 653, kbassuener@democratizationpolicy.org)

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