Kurt Bassuener September 23rd, 2009

NOTE:  due to a communications error between the author and the Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje, which ran Mr. Will’s Sunday Sept 20 Washington Post piece in translation, Oslobodjenje ran my response in translation on Sept 22, while it was still under consideration by the Post, which has not run the letter.  I regret the confusion this may have caused.  Below is the original English-language version of the letter, as sent to the Washington Post on Sept 21.

Kurt Bassuener

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To the Editor,

George F. Will wisely recommends that the President read Patrice McMahon and Jon Western’s article “The Death of Dayton,” (“Bosnia’s Lesson,” Sunday Sept 20th).  Yet his conclusion that Bosnia is failing because it was doomed to fail is flawed.
Bosnia is degenerating both because of structural elements in Dayton and its attendant election law and due to false assumptions the international community, and particularly the European Union, continue to hold dear.
 

The postwar structure of Bosnia has always been more of an oligarchy than a real democracy, allowing politicians almost complete lack of accountability to their citizens.  All they need do in an electoral campaign is promise “we will protect you from them,” and distribute public largesse.  They can then safely ignore the electorate for another four years. Until this dynamic is broken, Bosnia is inherently unstable and gravitates toward violent dissolution.
 

By 2005, the international assumption was that Bosnia was irreversibly on a path to being able to join the EU and NATO under its own power.  To compensate for the lack of forward movement from 2006 on, the EU has faked progress, hoping reality will catch-up to its declarations.  Brussels is sticking to its line that ending peace implementation will force Bosnian politicians to be responsible.  Nobody wants to admit that the magical EU formula isn’t achieving that result. Both Bosnia’s current political system and the international approach are at a dead end.
 

Neither blood or treasure, but rather high-level and sustained policy attention is required.  Only the US can catalyze a Western strategy.  Given that President Obama and Secretary Clinton have a lot on their plate, a presidential special envoy might be required to conjure a coherent Western strategy out of the current entropy.
 

The guardrails that have prevented the re-emergence of conflict – the executive High Representative and the EU military force, EUFOR – need to be reinforced.  Bosnians need to be clear that they will remain until a popularly legitimate governing system that can operate without these international failsafes is in place and seen to work.  Without these in place, a solution is impossible.
Even before NATO troops entered Bosnia in late 1995, the US and its allies were telegraphing their will to withdraw quickly.  We have been trying to undo the mistakes of those first two years ever since, with varying degrees of success.  Bosnia’s lesson should be that there are no shortcuts to establishing self-sustaining democratic governance.

Sincerely,
Kurt Bassuener
Senior Associate
Democratization Policy Council

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Kurt Bassuener August 7th, 2009

DPC Senior Associate Mark Lenzi, who formerly headed the International Republican Institute’s office in Tbilisi, Georgia, and his then-National Democratic Institute counterpart Lincoln Mitchell, have an excellent op-ed in today’s New York Times, “Georgia, One Year Later.” In their article, they warn of the danger of conflating a pro-American (and/or anti-Russian) policy with democracy.

In the year since the war between Russia and Georgia, it has become clear that in addition to the vague intention of resetting U.S. relations with Russia, Washington must develop distinct policies for Georgia and the other countries on Russia’s periphery and not continue to simply lump bilateral relations with post-Soviet governments together or in terms of their individual relations with Moscow. This new approach must reflect the reality of the Russian threat, but also the need for concrete political reform, which is the key to regional stability.

The authors also observe

Unfortunately, like its predecessor, the Obama administration often blurs and confuses the terms ‘friend’ and ‘democracy’ with regard to Georgia. This undermines the development of democracy in the former Soviet Union and beyond…the highly personalized nature of relations between the U.S. and Georgian leadership has contributed to bipartisan American reluctance to criticize the steps Georgia has made away from democracy in recent years.

While Georgia has indeed been a friend to America, demonstrating this by sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is certainly not a pure democracy. Yet this is how Georgia generally has been viewed by the Obama and Bush administrations. This was especially true during the war with Russia, when Georgia was often simplistically touted as the democratic David battling the authoritarian Russian Goliath.

Lenzi and Mitchell go on to recommend that the US redirect its assistance to Georgia away from arms and toward “media, civil society, and electoral and judicial reforms” and to make clear to the Saakashvili government that “Washington has higher standards for its allies and will no longer accept empty promises of democratic advancement.”

This message is one that is overdue and has implications for US policy elsewhere, and not only in the post-Soviet space.  Al Jazeera English’s brilliant “People and Power” series has just aired a devastating episode on the nature of the Bakiyev regime in Kyrgyzstan, which came to power in 2005 after what many dubbed the “Tulip Revolution,” the last and by far least transformative of the “color revolutions” in the former USSR.  The documentary illustrates the corruption and brutality of the regime, which appears to far outstrip the merely corrupt one it replaced, headed by Askar Akayev, and juxtaposes it with the lack of criticism from the Obama adminsitration, desperate to maintain the Manas airbase to support expanding military operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the world with both US and Russian military bases, and as many third world dictatorships did in the Cold War, manipulates both to get greater tribute.  This money never seems to reach the people.  Surprise, surprise.  Well worth watching.

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Kurt Bassuener June 9th, 2009

Following the publication of an op-ed in the New York Times by former US Ambassador to Serbia and Croatia William Montgomery that advocated partition of Bosnia and Kosovo, DPC Senior Associate Kurt Bassuener was invited by Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje to comment.  The following article appeared in the paper’s June 9 edition.  This is the original English language version.

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Dangerous Policy Vacuum Leaves Space for Unfulfilled Agendas

By Kurt Bassuener

Last Friday, William Montgomery, former US Ambassador to Croatia and Serbia, advocated in the New York Times an “achievable” US policy toward Kosovo and Bosnia: partitioning them along ethnic lines.  This is essentially what Dobrica ?osi? and other Serbian nationalist theorists have advocated for some time.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, when postwar Bosnia was stagnating, such arguments were heard more often.  It was a flawed prescription then, as it is now. Montgomery alludes to the reality that partition would be accompanied by violence when he mentions a need for “demonstrated will and readiness to use force to prevent violence along the way.”  And violence we would see, both in BiH and in Kosovo, if this policy were actively pursued.

But the global environment and the international posture in Bosnia is much different than it was in say 1998.  For this reason, Montgomery’s article could not have come at a better time for those who wish to present BiH as an “impossible country.”  The faux simplicity of Ambassador Montgomery’s proposal is what makes it dangerously seductive to those who simply wish to be done with it. 

Bosnia and Hercegovina is far from a lost cause.  But arriving at a system that can make it work won’t be easy.  No durable solution in the country can be achieved without a consensus on what the state can be, and how it can meet popular needs for security and functioning, accountable governance. 

The current constitutional and structural system designed to maximize opacity and unaccountability.  Regardless of their varying views on the full range of issues, that is one common foundation for all members of the political cartel in BiH.  Pressing the nerves of fear and mistrust has kept them in their comfortable positions; they have little incentive to develop a functioning democratic system. 

The real question for the international community is how to ensure the necessary stability for those Bosnians who do want to make their country work to have a chance to come to accord.  This means maintaining an ability to prevent further deterioration while adopting a strategy to promote the necessary popular accommodation to arrive at a functional system.

Despite the big bang of Vice President Joe Biden’s visit and his direct statements to the BiH Parliament, there remains no clarity in international approach.  Bosnian politics went back to business as usual in days, with politicians predictably approaching Biden’s speech as a smorgasbord, picking out (and spinning) the elements they thought favorable to their positions and ignoring what they didn’t like.  There has been no follow up from Washington since.

The most likely way to catalyze a common approach is through a US presidential special envoy.  However, Biden said in an interview to this newspaper Friday that none was forthcoming.  The US remains stuck still hoping to follow an EU lead, should one materialize. None is visible on the horizon.

Only leadership by EU member states can move the Brussels bureaucracy, which thinks it has arrived at a magic formula that need only be applied.  Without any members proposing a strategy, the Brussels bureaucratic sausage machine will generate more lowest-common-denominator policies with no prospects of success. 

While the US cannot run an effective policy in Bosnia without the EU, only the US can galvanize a coherent strategy among its members.  Vague articulations of “the European path” and various process checklists are no substitute. 

There needs to be a clear articulation of what sort of Bosnia the EU will accept into the fold. The international community must commit that any such solution would have to obtain qualified majority consent of all Bosnia’s constituent peoples, as well as those “others” who are effectively second-class citizens in the Dayton system.  This will end speculation that some “Dayton II” is in the works that will impose a solution. The EU and US both need to state that will help facilitate the process by which a working consensus is reached. To make the discussion possible, the determination to maintain the guardrails that have averted implosion in Bosnia for 13 years remains essential.  That means retaining an operationally credible EUFOR and the legal platform, though not necessarily the office, of the High Representative.

The only fixation of the EU and most of its members regarding Bosnia, including the incoming Swedish presidency, is “transition” – closing the OHR and inaugurating a “reinforced” EUSR.  This is touted as an end in itself.  Aside from the amount of personnel EUSR will likely have, there is still no clarity on what this mission would actually aim to achieve.  In theory, this “reinforced” EUSR could be a positive development, if launched after full completion of 5+2 and if designed and equipped for the Bosnian reality.  Yet it seems the main goal is to divest itself of any power, and therefore responsibility should Bosnia fail. While not a policy design, the essence of Montgomery’s vision might arrive by default, with the attendant consequences.

The costs of failure – human, moral, and financial – would be massive and enduring for the EU – and the US as well.  The EU must recognize that the bill would land on its doorstep.  The reality is that the EU would have to devote far more troops than it currently fields to manage a carve-up, and it would be a far more dangerous mission for them, given that many Bosnians would see them as complicit. 

Even with a coherent strategy and the will to see it through, there is no guarantee of success.  Ultimately, if Bosnia’s citizens cannot agree on a way to make the country work, it cannot.  But under the current system, they haven’t had that chance.  Given the stakes, the international community owes Bosnia and its own taxpayers a full-bore effort to allow them that opportunity.  Once again, only American leadership can prevent a broader international failure.

Kurt Bassuener is a Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion.

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Kurt Bassuener June 9th, 2009

USIPeace Briefing - Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is to be Done?

On April 3rd, DPC Senior Associates Kurt Bassuener and James Lyon attended a policy briefing on international policy toward Bosnia and Hercegovina hosted by the US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. 

In late May, USIP published a USIPeace Briefing written by Bassuener and Lyon reviewing both the proceedings and then presenting the authors’ view on what the US-EU joint strategy must be.  This paper was followed by two papers with alternate points of view on the necessary approach - also available at the link above.  Bassuener and Lyon’s briefing is available in PDF format above.

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Kurt Bassuener March 11th, 2009

Ahmet Alibašic, DPC Senior Associate and lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, wrote an article in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal Europe on Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s efforts to rally support against the International Criminal Court’s issuance of a warrant for his arrest on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Ahmet writes from his perspective as a Bosnian Muslim:

Muslim victims of genocide in Bosnia finally gained some succor from the arrest last July of former Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic. Yet Muslims in Darfur are still being victimized by the regime of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, whom the International Criminal Court indicted Wednesday.
 
As a Bosnian and a Muslim who suffered from international passivity in the face of genocide, I am appalled at Mr. Bashir’s transparent attempt at ethnoreligious manipulation. The international community — with Muslims at the forefront — should instead stand with Mr. Bashir’s victims and demand that he be brought to justice at the International Criminal Court (ICC).
 
Defending Mr. Bashir in the name of Islam is particularly odious. Muslim leaders already have failed their brother Bashir by missing opportunities over the years to help him by stopping him, as the Prophet Muhammad advised. Helping your brother whether he is right or wrong is not the Islamic way.
 
At a grassroots level, some Muslim voices have broken through the din of support for Mr. Bashir among Muslim leaders. After the ICC prosecutor announced the charges, the American Islamic Community correctly identified “our moral duty to seek justice for thousands of fellow Muslims murdered simply for having the wrong identity.”

Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama has condemned the expulsion of humanitarian aid groups by Bashir, but the American policy response remains unclear.

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Kurt Bassuener March 6th, 2009

Yesterday’s Washington Post published an op-ed by retired US Air Force Chief of Staff and former Obama campaign co-chair Gen. Merrill A. “Tony” McPeak and DPC Senior Associate Kurt Bassuener calling for the US to work together with its European allies to establish a no-fly zone over Darfur.  The article followed on the International Criminal Court’s issue of a warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s arrest for war crimes and crimes against humanity:

President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice have all advocated a more engaged and effective policy to end the suffering in Darfur. They have also agreed that creating a no-fly zone over the region would change the dynamic on the ground.

…

By taking away the Sudanese government’s freedom to use air power to terrorize its population, the West would finally get enough leverage with Khartoum to negotiate the entry of a stronger U.N. ground force. Effective military action in the form of a no-fly zone would not preclude a political resolution, as some suggest, but in fact would make diplomacy more effective by reducing Bashir’s options.

Bashir has strung the international community along in a way that the late Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic would have envied. A no-fly zone is the best way to turn the conflict to his disadvantage. President Obama has vowed to act multilaterally, where possible, to build real, consensus solutions to international security problems. Decisive international action in Darfur may present the best opportunity to demonstrate this resolve.

The article’s argument was endorsed by New York Times columnist and persistent Darfur advocate Nicholas Kristof in his blog yesterday.

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Kurt Bassuener February 25th, 2009

DPC Senior Associate James Lyon penned an op-ed published in today’s International Herald Tribune on the deterioriating situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina, “Halting the downward spiral.”  In his article, he summarizes the threat:

Inexplicably, the European Union and the United States pursue policies that could all but guarantee Bosnia will revert to war. A new conflict in Bosnia could have unwanted consequences for Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, and would result not only in loss of life, destruction of property, refugee flows and the abolishment of Bosnia’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, but also would create serious rifts within NATO and destroy all pretense of EU common foreign policy. It could cause Balkan states to turn their backs on European integration and seek closer ties with Russia.

…and also the feeble international response:

In response to the escalating threat, the United States has withdrawn its general from NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, while the EU has reduced its peacekeeping force (Eufor) to approximately 2,100 troops, and announced impending withdrawals of 500 more, along with the withdrawal of its only airworthy helicopters. Eufor stopped patrolling in 2007, amid complaints that its troops were bored. France, Finland, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland are all rushing for the exits.

The international community appears to be on autopilot as it rushes to close the international supervisory mission in Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative, leaving only the European Union Special Representative, with an uncertain mandate and weak powers, as the leading international presence. Many EU members seem convinced, and the U.S. appears to hope, that the transition to a weak EU special representative will create momentum and somehow motivate Bosnia’s politicians to change their behavior.

He advocates the following remedy:

Bosnia’s backward slide can be halted with few new resources, but it will take outside-the-box thinking. This will include Washington re-engaging and appointing a special presidential envoy to the Balkans, who can help the Western alliance focus policies and deliver consistent messages. It also requires a robust office of the EU special representative and that the EU take the threat seriously and make Eufor a capable deterrent. Most of all, it requires a long-term commitment to state-building in Bosnia. Too much has been invested and too much is at stake to continue with current policies.

In the same issue of the Herald Tribune, NY Times reporter Dan Bilefsky reports on the fallout from a criminal investigation launched against Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik:

 Dodik expressed indignation over the weekend, saying he was the victim of a witch hunt aimed at undermining him and the Bosnian Serb Republic. “Even the little faith I had in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is now lost due to this farce with the criminal charges against me,” he said Saturday. “They have made this country pointless.”…

Dodik also vented his ire at a meeting Saturday in Mostar, where leaders of Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups were discussing how to press forward with changes to the constitution. Attendees at the meeting said Dodik stormed out after one hour. Before leaving, they said, he delivered an ultimatum that a new constitution could only proceed if it affirmed the right of the Bosnian Serb Republic to national self-determination and enshrined its right to hold a referendum on independence.

He also quoted Bosnian political analyst Srecko Latal:

“The United States and the European Union must engage, not just for the sake of Bosnia, but because the world can’t afford to allow what happened the last time,” Latal said in an interview. While Bosnia is patrolled by a 2,000-strong EU peacekeeping force, he said it was not strong enough if hostilities erupted.

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Kurt Bassuener February 20th, 2009

DPC Policy Brief - How to Pull-Out of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Dead-End calls for strong leadership of and tools for the “reinforced” European Union Special Representative (EUSR) mission to follow closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  The brief notes the rising climate of fear and uncertainty in the country must be arrested by the international community to stop the slide toward conflict.  The paper also argues that only by confronting the constitutional reform issue can the EU assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in meeting EU standards.

 To the EU:
1) Appoint a politically capable leader as High Representative/EUSR.
2) Articulate clear constitutional reform guidelines and make constitutional reform the core of the EUSR mandate.
3) Give the EUSR executive authority to confront anti-Dayton activity.
4) Ensure that EUFOR has credible operational capacity throughout the country to deter and respond to threats to public security and the Dayton Peace Accords.
5) Authorize the EUSR to decide on fulfilment of EU conditions and all sanctions.
6) Ensure EUSR possesses anti-organized crime and corruption investigative capacity.
7) Maintain a broad international coalition in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To the Peace Implementation Council:
8) Insist on full completion of the 5+2 formula prior to closing OHR.

To the US:
9) Appoint a Presidential Special Envoy to the Balkans to demonstrate US engagement and promote international policy cohesion.
10) Post a US flag officer in the NATO HQ Sarajevo to identify training and exercise opportunities.

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Kurt Bassuener February 17th, 2009

DPC Senior Associate James Lyon has written a Policy Brief on the still unstable situation in the Western Balkans, and the need for re-engagement by the Unitied States through a Presidential Special Envoy.  A brief description of the policy brief is below, with a link to the full paper:

Euro-Atlantic policies towards the Western Balkans have reached the limits of their effectiveness, as countries throughout the region have hit a brick wall in the reform and European integration process. It is time to examine the effectiveness of the western alliance’s policy approach towards the Western Balkans and adjust it to meet new realities.This paper examines the challenges facing the western alliance in the Balkans, the limits of international influence under current policy, and the options available to enhance progress in the region. It offers five policy recommendations that will, if implemented, substantially alter the policy dynamic and assist the Euro-Atlantic alliance to stabilize the region and move it forward in the European accession process without substantial new resources. It also argues that little progress will occur in the region until the United States resumes its leadership role.Recommendations:

1. The United States (US) needs to re-engage diplomatically in the region by appointing a Special Presidential Envoy to the Balkans.
2. The practice of “dual-hatting” European Union Special Representatives with functions of non-EU missions should cease, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3. The US and European Union (EU) should resist the temptation to further draw down troop levels either in Kosovo or Bosnia, and the US should reinsert a flag-level officer in NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.
4. Both the EU and US should treat all countries equally, stop giving Serbia preferential treatment and refuse to lower standards, especially regarding corruption.
5. The EU and US should engage on assuring energy security to the region, by expediting the Nabucco pipeline and including a spur into the Western Balkans.

The full brief is available in PDF at the link below:

DPC Policy Brief - Rethinking US Policy toward the Western Balkans

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Eric Witte December 29th, 2008

Kurt has an op-ed in today’s Irish Times, reiterating points DPC made last month in its Bosnia briefing: “Sliding toward the Precipice: Europe’s Bosnia Policy” [PDF].  Kurt argues that the Irish should take the lead in pushing the European Union to develop a strategy toward Bosnia:

There are differences in the EU. Britain and the Netherlands are for adherence to the benchmarks set this year. Sweden, Spain, Italy and others believe the accession process itself will solve Bosnia’s problems, and that transition is overdue.

Germany, the swing vote, is in between. While these differences in posture are wide, none qualifies as a strategy. None of the current approaches here defines success.

By now this ought to be obvious: EU success in Bosnia means ensuring a constitutional order allowing a single political centre. The Dayton constitution creates three centres, each rewarding nationalist candidates who generate inter-ethnic fears. This has enabled Bosnian politicians to promise to protect “their” traumatised electorates, gaining a lack of accountability unimaginable in other European states. Until a constitution forces responsive politics, Bosnia will continue to gravitate towards violent dissolution.

The EU’s greatest leverage is as EU gatekeeper. Transformations requiring major political will from applicants must be accomplished before EU entry. Brussels should articulate guidelines for a Bosnian constitutional order that it could accept: one promoting a political centre. This constitutional development process will require EU assistance, and should be the new EU Special Representative’s primary role. No other reforms have any durability without that foundation. A proven politician must lead this effort for the EU.

The EU must recognise that its capacity to deter violence through its military force, Eufor, has sunk below credibility. This raises the fear of renewed conflict among the population, making it more open to exploitation by politicians.

Ireland has invested to prevent a return to war in Bosnia. Ireland can now fill the leadership vacuum among EU member states by promoting a radical policy redirection as outlined above, building a consensus, and applying the Union’s leverage.

Read the whole thing here.

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