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Proposals for stronger western action to defend Georgia from Russia’s invasion have tended to be short on specifics. For example, Bill Kristol asks in yesterday’s New York Times:
Shouldn’t we therefore now insist that normal relations with Russia are impossible as long as the aggression continues, strongly reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and offer emergency military aid to Georgia?
The first proposal is a given - as long as the attack continues, western relations with Russia will be anything but normal. That seems like weak motivation for Putin to call an end to the war while such tantalizing goals remain within his grasp.
The second action is only a verbal commitment absent other actions. As I wrote earlier, at least with regard to Ukraine, it could actually be helpful in defining its sovereignty as a red line for the West. But I’m not sure it does anything for Georgia at this point.
The third proposal - emergency military aid - is more concrete when it comes to doing something to defend Georgia now, but Russia has moved swiftly and controls Georgia’s airspace. How would emergency military aid even be delivered? Would Georgia still have a functioning military by the time it got there? Then, of course, there’s the question of how Russia would respond.
Over at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Andrew Wilson mourns the European Union’s disunity over Georgia prior to the outbreak of war.
I think Wilson strikes the right balance in attributing the eruption of fighting to a mix of Mikheil Saakashvili’s blundering and Russia’s provocation:
“The South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali is surprisingly close to Tbilisi. But a quick campaign made no sense from Saakashvili’s position of weakness. He may have built up his armed forces with American help since 2004, but his most important assets are moral, although his image as the leader of a beleaguered democracy was already tarnished by his suppression of anti-government demonstrations in Tbilisi last November.
Saakashvili may have thought the Olympics Games would give him cover, especially as Putin was in Beijing and Russia hosts the next Winter Games just over the border in Sochi in 2014. But this only made him look duplicitous, especially as he announced a ceasefire just before launching the invasion.
The Georgian may therefore already be losing the all-important propaganda war. The Russians always thought Saakashvili would be easy to provoke and have been prodding and jabbing since the spring. A minority of Nato states may argue that the conflict increases the case for Georgian membership, but in others, scepticism is more likely to grow.”
But Wilson argues that it’s not only Georgia that has overplayed its hand. Russia has as well:
“Both sides risk serious collateral damage: the Georgians to their Nato and EU ambitions, the Russians to President Medvedev’s proposals for a new security treaty in Europe and to their relations with the incoming US president. […] Both sides have miscalculated, but, for all the talk of “genocide”, both have incentives to step back from the brink.”
I’m much less optimistic that Russia has miscalculated in this situation. I don’t see how prospects for a new security treaty in Europe or the vague lure of getting off to a good start with the new U.S. president will be enough to offset Russia’s interest in ousting a pesky pro-western leader on its border, re-asserting control over its “near abroad” and increasing its grip over Europe’s energy supplies. Regarding the U.S. relationship, Ronald Asmus and Richard Holbrooke may be correct that Russia intends to oust Saakashvili before the American election so that ties can be perceived as being on the mend again by the time of the January 20 presidential inaguration.
Wilson calls on the EU to work with NATO, the OSCE, UN and U.S. to push for a truly international peacekeeping force. From the context, he seems to mean that this force would replace the Russian-led “peacekeeping missions” in the two disputed regions. From Moscow’s position of power right now, I find it hard to imagine any such concession.
Al Jazeera English just reported that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili just signed a ceasefire agreement with the French and Finnish Foreign Ministers, Bernard Kouchner and Alexander Stubb. It has reportedly already been rejected by Russia. The two men are now touring bomb damage in Gori on live TV with their Georgian counterpart. They reportedly had to duck and cover from a Russian bombing sortie.
How much traction he will get with it is far from clear. This action by Russia, while given a pretext by the Tskhinvali operation by the Georgians, was clearly in the works for some time, given the weight of force applied and the wide spread area of operations. As Eric Witte noted earlier, the Russian government has been open about the desire to see Saakashvili ousted. Vitali Churkin, the Russian UN Ambassador, said the following yesterday in a sharp exchange with US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad:
Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador, accused Moscow of seeking “regime change” in Georgia and resisting attempts to make peace after days of deadly fighting.
“Is your government’s objective regime change in Georgia, the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Georgia?” Khalilzad asked Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador.
Churkin said “regime change is an American expression. We do not use such an expression”.
But he added: “But sometimes there are occasions, and we know from history, that there are different leaders who come to power, either democratically or semi-democratically, and they become an obstacle.”
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Putin, who is clearly and literally calling the shots, has only upsides from this increasingly ambitious attack within Georgia. He bet - correctly - that there would be no active military response from the outside (and none is foreseeable). He managed to paint Saakashvili as rash and irresponsible. He is betting that ultimately Georgian domestic support for the government will wane as Russia continues its assault. And he’s betting that this war will not only reduce the likelihood of Georgia getting into NATO, but reduce NATO and American credibility in Russia’s “near abroad” and beyond. The US and NATO may come to be seen as an unreliable ally.
Georgians have asked what their troop deployment to Iraq got them, now that the US is not intervening in Georgia. This is a fair and understandable question. The term “ally” has been devalued in the past seven years through the Bush administration’s “with us or against us” approach, and expectation that NATO applicants should send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq - the latter a war none of these countries had a voice in choosing. Allies are supposed to consult and listen to each other, and take each other’s interests into account before engaging in a conflict. It is doubtful that Saakashvili did so before he sent troops into Tskhinvali. Neither Tblisi or Washington had apparently planned for this eventuality, despite it being foreseeable.
All the opprobrium of the international community has not made a dent in Russia’s plan to crush Georgia.
As Russia pushes its ground forces into central Georgia, it’s not clear what its ultimate goals are. According to Washington, Russia has made clear that it seeks to remove Mikheil Saakashvili. Will Moscow stop there? There’s a distinct danger that Vladimir Putin (and it seems fairly clear in all of this that from his prime minister’s perch, he’s still calling the shots) could try to move beyond sidelining the pro-western leadership of Georgia and look for a reason to turn on Ukraine. For the West so far, it’s not clear what exactly can be done about Georgia without risking war with Russia. The U.S. may try to fly back the 2,000 Georgian troops in Iraq, but what difference would that make - assuming Russia even allows the transport flight to land? Russia will have 2,000 more targets: not much more than a speed bump.
Looking past Georgia, perhaps NATO should think ahead and establish a clear red line with regard to Ukraine. That way, it is Russia that would have to actively risk militarily provoking the West in order to expand the war into Ukraine, not the West having to decide following a potential Russian assault on Ukraine whether it wants to actively risk war with Russia.
This wouldn’t do anything for Georgia, but could help to avoid worst-case scenarios.
AFP reports Russian forces are moving on Gori, well into central Georgia, with aerial attacks and artillery assaults. Al Jazeera’s Jonah Hull reports from Tblisi, having been in Gori earlier in the day, the word that the Russians were en route, and the mass exodus that followed.
In his interview on CNN, Russian UN Ambassador Vitali Churkin said that Russia was “take care of military infrastructure” in Georgia as part of its operation “in defense of the civilian population” of South Ossetia, and that tragically civilian casualties in Georgia are possible. Those are sure to mount should the Russians advance into a city that is rapidly becoming a ghost town.
The conflict that began in the Georgian breakaway enclave of South Ossetia on August 7 shows no sign of ending, with Russian aircraft bombarding targets well outside the conflict zone - outside the capital, in the Black Sea port of Poti, and in the city immediately south of South Ossetia, Gori, which had been a staging area for the Georgian effort to re-establish sovereignty over South Ossetia’s capital, Tskhinvali. Some of the best reporting comes from Al Jazeera English’s Jonah Hull, who has been in the conflict zone since before Saakashvili’s effort to retake South Ossetia, by interviewing refugees moving into North Ossetia, in Russia. His footage of civilian casualties in Gori yesterday was bracing.
The conflict has now expanded to Georgia’s other separatist area, Abkhazia, which has called for UN military observers to leave, and has mobilized its armed forces to approach its self-declared borders and itself declared a state of war, citing an “obligation” to support South Ossetia. Georgia claims thousands Russian troops have landed in Abkhazia, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet, based at Sevastopol in Ukraine’s Crimea, is establishing a blockade off the Georgian coast - though Moscow denies this is the case.
Georgia is calling for a ceasefire, but Russia has not yet taken them up on it, apparently aiming to secure both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia declares that is is withdrawing its forces from Tskhinvali, but Russia disputes this - a
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BBC correspondent claimed that there was still some combat going on. US Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad claimed that Russian forces were preventing the withdrawal of the Georgian troops. Russia is demanding a unilateral withdrawal of Georgian forces from South Ossetia and a signed agreemement with South Ossetia of non-aggression as conditions for a cease fire. Russian UN Ambassador Vitali Churkin was in rare form in the UNSC today, asking whether 2000 civilian casualties and tens of thousands of refugees constituted a genocide, and mused whether the Georgians thought Russian peacekeepers in a pre-conflict joint force would have “run away” like those in Srebrenica…
In his speech to announce a state of war yesterday, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called on the West to assist Georgia with acts, not words, and repeatedly cited Georgian democracy and international values. Russia, too, is citing international standards, claiming this operation is “peace enforcement” and ”humanitarian intervention,” using terms to mimic those employed in 1999 with regard to the NATO operation in Kosovo. Vitali Churkin made this link directly in rebutting Khalilzad’s criticism of attacks outside the conflict zone, citing bombing of Belgrade in 1999.
Russia seems to have been waiting for a pretext to “teach Georgia a lesson” for some time, annoyed by its persistent efforts to get into NATO and the EU, and citing Kosovo as a precedent for its intervention. Prime Minister Putin is firmly in charge, arriving directly in North Ossetia from the Olympics in Beijing to command the operation. He may even be aiming to get Saakashvili ousted from within. That does not look in the immediate offing.
But what does seem clear is that Saakashvili dramatically miscalculated his position when he attempted to seize Tskhinvali, and gave Russia the rope to hang him with. His calls for international support are being met only in the diplomatic realm, but it is hard to see what else he could have expected when picking a fight with his much stronger and increasingly assertive neighbor. Far from drawing closer to the EU and NATO, the war that Georgia has stumbled into makes these goals that much less likely.
Yet without a doubt, calling the Russian military action “disproportionate” is accurate. Putin senses there is no external will to resist his drive, and he’s certainly correct. But the Russian war in Georgia may have the opposite consequence than Putin intended, convincing other neighbors of the need to get into binding arrangements with the West, rather than deterring them.
The African Union has suspended Mauritania’s membership until constitutional order is restored in the country. The move follows the U.S. government’s decision to suspend non-humanitarian assistance and indications that the European Union will follow suit. Coup leader Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz is asking for international understanding, but sounds nervous. If the international community can maintain and ramp up pressure on the junta, it’s hard to see how it will be able to hang on to power. So far, so good.
The government in Khartoum has agreed to a power-sharing deal in the disputed region of Abyei. A member of the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement is to serve as administrator of the oil-rich area, with a local pro-Khartoum Arab to serve as his deputy.
Assuming this deal holds (and past agreements haven’t, so don’t hold your breath), one wonders whether Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir hasn’t entered the compromise in order to strengthen the case that he’s an indispensible guarantor of peace with the south. A settlement in disputed Abyei could serve to dampen international enthusiasm to see al-Bashir handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if ICC judges approve the prosecutor’s request for Darfur-related charges of genocide against him. In any case, the possibility should be considered in the larger debate over whether peace and justice are at odds in Sudan.
The international response to Wednesday’s military coup in Mauritania has been strong and swift. Impressively, on the part of the United States, the State Department announced yesterday that all non-humanitarian aid to Mauritania was being suspended immediately. Of some $23 million, around $15 million of the suspended funds consist of military-to-military assistance. This is particularly of note because one of the coup supporters’ complaints is that President Sidi Cheikh Ould Abdallahi had released Islamist prisoners against the army’s advice.
Since September 2001, the U.S. has markedly increased military assistance to the countries of the Sahel as a part of the “global war on terror”, so one can imagine that with this particular complaint, the coup plotters might have enjoyed some sympathy within the Pentagon, or, say, the Office of the Vice President. It’s good news indeed that the administration instead chose to join the African Union, Arab League,* and European Union in condemnation of the coup. The immediate suspension of non-humanitarian aid and a multi-million dollar grant from the Millennium Challenge Corporation is even better.
However, the latest coup in Mauritania, after its first year ever of democratic governance, still raises serious questions about U.S. military aid in the region. Where democratic culture is barely established and elements of the parliamentary opposition so easily gravitate to backing for a putsch by disgruntled generals, does it make sense to be pouring major resources into strengthening militaries?
Kurt has a letter in today’s Financial Times in response to an op-ed last week written by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic. Djelic argued that with Serbia’s arrest of Radovan Karadzic, it was time to place the relationship between the EU and Belgrade on new footing by dropping policies of conditionality. He argued that the EU should approve Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and advance it to the status of a candidate for EU membership, as well as immediately implement visa liberalization.
In his letter, Kurt argues that it was Dutch and Belgian insistance on Serbia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as a prerequisite to SAA approval that led to Karadzic’s arrest, and that this policy should remain in place until the final two remaining fugitives are apprehended:
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Sir, Bozidar Djelic, deputy prime minister of Serbia, asserts that it is time for the European Union to approach Serbia with a new policy of disciplined partnership between the EU and Serbia [which] yields much better results than the old one, based on conditionality and sanctions (“For the good of Europe give Serbia a chance”, August 4).
Yet it is precisely the application of conditionality, insisted upon by only two of the 27 EU member states – the Netherlands and Belgium – that compelled President Boris Tadic to arrest and transfer Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader, to face trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Had it been up to the other 25 and the EU machinery, that condition would have been waived, the stabilisation and association agreement’s interim benefits activated, and the process of ratification would have begun. The message is not that conditionality failed, but rather that it works when firmly applied.
None of this diminishes the credit to Serbia’s government for the arrest and handover of a man indicted for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Nor does it undercut the need for a credible membership perspective for Serbia and its western Balkan neighbours Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania.
It does appear that the Serbian government is approaching the search for the remaining indictees – Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and Croatian Serb political leader Goran Hadzic – with greater vigour with the installation of the new government. President Tadic has reaped domestic political advantages from the arrest of Mr Karadzic, helping him paint his Radical opposition as weak and binding the Socialists in his coalition ever closer, since their erstwhile allies and much of the party rank and file view the Karadzic arrest as treason.
Serbia is being given a chance by the EU, despite Mr Djelic’s aggrieved whimpering about unfair treatment. Serbia will prove its readiness for “partnership” with the EU when it arrests and transfers Mr Mladic and Mr Hadzic. Until then, the EU should not move forward on SAA implementation or ratification, let alone moving forward towards candidate status.
It would be best for Belgrade and Brussels if these loose ends were finally tied up by the time of visits by Serge Brammertz, the ICTY chief prosecutor, later this month.
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