NB: These reflections are my personal recollections and musings from a roadtrip taken by myself and DPC colleague Valery Perry June 3-13 from Sarajevo, ultimately to Thessaloniki. Our route took us through Serbia’s Sandžak, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, into Greece – and back via the main highway through Šumadija (Kragujevac, Cacak, Uzice). We conducted interviews with civic actors (and the occasional international official) in Novi Pazar, North Mitrovica, Prishtina, Tetovo, and Skopje.
From Sarajevo to Novi Pazar
Sandžak: This was my first visit to Novi Pazar; my second to Serbian Sandžak (but that was in December 2000 as an ODIHR election observer around Prijepolje, in the northwestern part of Serbian Sandžak). Sandžak is pacified internally, with no apparent international attention or awareness. OSCE is there but apparently effectively absentee; diplomats parachute in for project drive-bys with no substantial engagement – this despite at least five years of fixation on CVE {Countering Violent Extremism}, VERLT {Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism}, or all the acronyms for (virtually totally unrealized) fears of locally grown, seeded, or transplanted extremism in the part of the country where there is a Muslim majority in large areas.
Later in Thessaloniki, a colleague from Belgrade made a point on the first coffee break that after the December 2023 local election in Novi Pazar, there had been demonstrations against electoral fraud. This resonated with a Novi Pazar interlocutor’s opining that only Ugljanin is a sort of opposition, since Vučić froze him out. Election posters for various seemingly indistinguishable parties were all over the place (SDA, SDP – “Sandžak Demokratski Pokret” of Rasim Ljajić {bizarrely offering “new energy”}, various other parties) – characterized by personalities rather than ideas or competing visions.
Essentially, the local Muslim/Bosniak population accept SNS dominance for a small slice, a “Komunalna Milicija” (e.g., seeming traffic cops – an element of coercive power, but only for use against the local population), and little in the way of power on the national stage. Kadyrovtsi, in other words. Just competition over their respective market shares. VJ military presence was evident around the valley city as well – demonstrating who’s boss. These forces also obviously are oriented south, toward the Kosovo border.
What we heard, unbidden, was that despite being overwhelmingly the majority population, positions under the competence of the state – as opposed to the municipality – remain disproportionately Serb (anecdotally, 8 of 10 firefighter recently recruited in Novi Pazar, for example). Our first interlocutor noted that “Sandžak Muslims are now treated as Albanians were in Kosovo in the 1990s.” This seemed stark. But the power imbalance was evident; development and infrastructure were notably deficient. Emigration was a major factor. Obtaining a nightcap beer required a pass down the main pedestrian zone to find a community near an Orthodox Church. Cafes/tea rooms were overwhelmingly populated by men; a mixed crowd was visible in the immediate town center.
Depopulation was also mentioned – our first interlocutor asserted that 50% of the population was gone most of the year, except during summer and winter holidays, when the diaspora floods back (from Novi Pazar, this means predominantly from Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg; we also saw French, Italian, and Swiss plates). The deficiencies in infrastructure were less dire with the generally reduced population. He asserted that Muslims from western Sandžak often gravitated to BiH; from southeast, it was further afield into the EU itself. My colleague Valery observed that she saw a greater proportion of women – though far from a majority – wearing headscarves than on her visits a few years previous.
From Novi Pazar south into Kosovo
Recollection from the drive to Mitrovica: It was beautiful, green hilly/mountainous territory approaching the border with Kosovo, driving along the Gazivoda reservoir (split between Kosovo and Serbia). Strangely, it had not previously dawned on me that the population on the Serbia-Kosovo border – at least approaching that border crossing – that the majority population seems Muslim pretty much all the way down.
In Kosovo,I came away with a more complicated and nuanced sense of the dynamics.
In North Mitrovica we received varied messages, some seemingly mutually contradictory, some at odds with our impressions. One of these, asserted by a pair of our interlocutors, was that all the pressure put on Kurti was performative and not serious – that the West favored him in the recent frictions. A wider sense among those we met was that the pace of reaction and adaptation that northern Serbs had to maintain was enervating and driving flight through both fear and lack of hope.
It definitely felt lower energy than the southern part of the city. The signifiers of division are there (some of the Serb-Russian iconography was worrisome). But I came away concluding, while wanting a wider sample and more discussions, a) the Serb community was genuinely and understandably put-off by several of Kurti’s moves, especially the deployment of the special police, and b) that for some in the local Serb community (many of whom are originally from south of the Ibar – and one at least from Serbia proper), it is hard to imagine even the most emollient Prishtina government and approach ever changing their view that “Kosovo is not a real country.” The special police posts that we passed at Gazivoda did not come off as hypermilitarized (a few containers by the side of the road – as of early June); there was a lot of complaint (within our small sample size) about expropriations of land for police posts. But at least one interlocutor agreed with my musing that losing Srpska Lista for new ethnic Albanian mayors without Serb votes was simply exchanging one sort of lack of true representation for another, as SL worked for Vučić, not for the local Serb community as such.
The first impression – actually a CONSTANT one – was how massively Prishtina has grown since my last visit, both downtown and in the surrounding sprawl. The number, height, and footprint of building was breathtaking, built as if for a much greater population than seemed there. Part of it was reputedly investment, and another money laundering – those relative proportions indeterminate. According to an interlocutor there, this “wild construction” was of questionable fire code compliance; she also noted the impact on air circulation and quality in the city (an issue with which we are all too familiar in Sarajevo). It was on the scale of Tirana in terms of exponential and seemingly minimally planned growth (over the same period) to my eyes. The road south to the North Macedonian border was built up at least half the way south, more than halfway to Kačanik, with building supply stores, furniture showrooms, etc. My personal favorite was the “American Brain” private hospital, perhaps 10-15km from central Prishtina. Not “brain hospital,” but perhaps rather implying that the brains of the medical staff were either American or molded there.
There was a wide variance of views among respondents of all backgrounds on the approach the Kurti government has taken; not much of it favorable. Several of the interlocutors who related critiques were highly persuasive. However, the lopsided international approach to the dialogue with Belgrade was acknowledged by all those we met in Prishtina.
It was impossible not to conclude that the Dialogue, as such, is another Western zombie policy, maintained for systemic stability, because nobody wants to think forward. It’s clearly ceased to be even a small-bore problem solver (as it was early on), because it has devolved into (typically fruitless) attempts to conjure useless signifiers of continued vitality as opposed to focusing on the end goals – the very point of its being initiated in 2013. Geopolitical imperatives, taken in their current reductionist bare alignment-seeking form, further perverts an already brain-dead process. Clarity from the West to both parties that recognition is the goal – and that representation of Serbs and other minorities wherever they live, as well as ALL Kosovo citizens, a la Ahtisaari – ought to be the intended outcome. That is, if the Dialogue is going to continue, then there is a need for a return to first principles. This could be justified geopolitically as well – and perhaps prompt Ukrainian support (not a huge factor, but a moral win, to build on their PACE votes). Then the EU and wider West could refocus on both, a) jointly defending Kosovo sovereignty AND pressing for effective representation/integration a la Ahtisaari – helping facilitate creative solutions on the latter; and b) cease giving indulgences to Vučić, to in turn provide at least a glimmer of hope to Serbian citizens not captured by his party machine that the EU is thinking about them too. Vučić has used the Dialogue for over a decade as a shield behind which he could relentlessly consolidate a singularity of power in Serbia. Ceasing the pantomime of the Dialogue would reorient Western policy toward both democracy (in both countries and the region) and conflict transformation rather than simply conflict management (with benefits). This could help compel a long overdue reckoning within Serbia about its borders, its past, and its lack of a social contract.
Kurti, for his part, is performative and not pragmatic in his pursuit of a universally held strategic goal for Kosovo: international subjectivity, mutual recognition, and full sovereignty. His dogmatism may win him points among Kosovar Albanians looking to Albania and Serbia and their strongmen, but it has lost him international leverage.
Several interlocutors in Prishtina asserted that given Western alignment, the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM was a bullet Kosovo had to bite. Yet absent the confidence of the initially intended payoff – recognition by both Serbia and the five EU non-recognizers – the likelihood of this seems low. Popular opposition to the proposed “land swap” (a.k.a. partition) helped get Kurti elected in the first place – twice. “Mutual recognition” is a phrase unuttered in Western officialdom in some time. And confidence in the EU member states living up to their commitments is low following the experience of North Macedonia – first in the aftermath of Prespa, then with adoption of Bulgaria’s position.
In sum: While nothing fundamentally altered my views on the power imbalance between Serbia and Kosovo – as well as the injustice in Western concentration of criticism and consequences on Prishtina (while giving Vučić/Belgrade a pass on everything Kosovo- and Serbia-related) – the miscalculations, policy choices, and judgements of Kurti and his government did come into considerably sharper focus.
From Prishtina into North Macedonia
En route south, once past the long stretch of businesses along the road running toward Tetovo, we saw at least three – perhaps four? – white stork nests (some with visible storklets!) perched on-high: on telephone poles, etc. That was wonderful to see.
North Macedonia: I had been in the country in March 2023, so absent for not nearly as long an interval as for Kosovo. We arrived soon after elections; election posters were everywhere.
EVERYONE we spoke with, professionally and socially, agreed that SDSM had blown it massively while in power, gravitating to easy venality vs. actually working to deliver a justice dividend, as demanded in the 2016 “Colorful Revolution.” Several also asserted a view that in the government’s latter stages, the prominence given to DUI came back to bite. Much of the damage that the party suffered was self-inflicted, both for that betrayal – and the sense that they let Gruevski escape (presumably in exchange for getting Prespa over the line). But there was also wide agreement that when delivering on Prespa, undoubtedly a heavy lift, they got kicked in the teeth by Macron in particular, and then screwed while already down by Borisov et al in Bulgaria – also for their own domestic political reasons. As one interlocutor related, “in Macedonia, people vote against.” SDSM should take the time in the wilderness to go through a thorough housecleaning, but it’s hard to be confident there is anyone in the party waiting to wield a broom, bucket, or scythe. It’s more likely that – in true peace cartel fashion – they will wait for the pendulum to swing, so they can cash-in once more. As with BiH, it’s hard to see anyone on the current political landscape who inspires hope. Those who have in the past have managed to dash it in their terms of office (as also seen in the other peace cartel, Bosnia and Herzegovina). It is all a struggle for market share in a system none will risk challenging: the rewards of power are too good.
It’s noteworthy that DUI lost as well – 8 years later than VMRO, when they should have been ousted. Albanians in North Macedonia never had their regime change. The question is whether the VLEN coalition of ethnic-Albanian opposition parties will – like SDSM – blow their chance, of course with VMRO-DPMNE help. There was, in the aggregate, a sense that even though the VMRO-DPMNE is unreconstructed, that the SDSM had it coming; its defeat was inevitable and richly deserved. One of our more long-term interlocutors even posited that VMRO, despite itself, may deliver more on the ideals/goals of the “Colorful Revolution,” in terms of actual systemic change (and Priebe Report recommendations) than SDSM.
Several interlocutors worried about the direction of travel on women and gender, from both VMRO-DPMNE and the VLEN coalition (particularly Besa). But there was a cross-interlocutor consensus, whatever the differentiation of views, that the problems are embedded and systemic in nature; alternations of power offer opportunities (and carry hazards), but not openings for fundamentally affecting the unaccountability and wide social and economic valence of power.
There is an overwhelming sense of wasted opportunity of the past seven years, but life goes on. Development – particularly construction in Skopje – is highly visible in spite of emigration, though not nearly as starkly pronounced as it is in Prishtina or Tirana. But is it GOOD? Housing prices are skyrocketing; many purchases are hedges for fear of other investments/assets losing value. The loss of green space, attendant pollution, pressure on already struggling/deficient infrastructure, and opportunity cost of paving over some of the most fertile agricultural land in the country, is also felt.
Bottom Line: Nobody in politics or civil society has strategic, transformational, broad societal visions, let alone actual plans. Nor does the West (a.k.a. in the Balkans “the international community”). It’s a free-for-all. Brain drain and emigration are evident – and seemed as givens everywhere we went, though capitals/regional centers were drawing people from a depopulating periphery.
Furthermore, beginning in Prishtina (where we by chance met two Macedonians upon arrival), we were asked incredulously “why would you overnight in Veles?” en route to Thessaloniki? When we replied it was on our way south, we’d never been there, and we wanted to see cities and towns outside capitals and major conurbations, nobody I can recall seemed swayed. As it happens, we had a very pleasant evening (once it cooled down), first visiting a striking – and strikingly placed – Partisan monument, then having dinner in a nice (and hopping) restaurant with a live and classy narodna muzika band on a Saturday night. It underscored to us the prevailing and undeserved disdain in dominant centers and among elites for the periphery.
The only sector in which strategic planning seems evident is in the mining sector, as well as in energy generation. In the extraction realm, there is no shortage of local “partners” (sellouts) – and a host of suitors. Contrast that with actual green energy potential for local consumption and potential export, IF there were transmission grid/storage/battery capacity. Given that the batteries are static, for storage, they need not be lithium-based (as with long-haul vehicles). ALL this seems ad hoc in the aggregate, without national, let alone regional or EU-integrated (for example, the Energy Community) strategic thinking and joined-up policy planning: critical raw materials (CRM), renewables, construction, infrastructure. Nor is any investment evident in: energy efficiency for dwellings (old or new) – including regulations for new construction or consumer awareness, railway integration, or grid upgrades/integration. In Veles, roughly 30-40 minutes from Skopje southward in the Vardar River valley, a railway bridge over the river was evidently disused and left to rust. This seemed stupid – as does the intentional disaggregation and destruction of the rail network assembled in the Yugoslav era, even after democratic breakthroughs in Croatia and Serbia and EU and NATO membership became feasible. If “green transition,” let alone regional interchange of goods, services, and persons is the goal, then integrating the most efficient and environmentally friendly form of land transport – rail – seems obvious.
Overall Reflections from Trip:
- The only “strategists,” to the extent that term applies (their activities feel too short-term, but they have the longest sight horizon we were able to discern), are external exploiters – their local henchmen simply facilitate (and collect rents). The dominant actors, in each country in the region, are the rentier/criminal political class as a whole.
- Kurti is an outlier in some important respects – he is not evidently crooked, which is particularly noteworthy in this ecosystem. Rather, he is a genuine ideologue (though an ideology of his own recipe, involving leftism, nationalism, and populism). But he self-sabotages in ways that obscure and even trump this with some audiences (for example, one North Mitrovica interlocutor claimed he’d be happy to have Thaçi back!). In addition, despite his previous campaign’s focus on internal economic, legal, and political reform, he has – like Vučić – made the international stage his focal point. For example, there is no evident interference or even engagement with the building boom and its discontents – the “wild development” (a term used by several interlocutors) and despoilation, or air pollution. This is a parallel to SDSM. He needs advice, but one gets the impression he doesn’t take it when offered.
- The Biden term’s potential has largely been squandered, as was the rhetorical recommitment to democratic values (amplified post-Feb 24, 2022), the year of elections… ALL the countries and societies of the region seem vulnerable to reactionary processes, disruption – the moral pull of the West is shot, at present. There is no belief. In that sense, for citizens it’s like post-normalization Czechoslovakia or 1970s-1980s USSR – but without the hope then available of any alternative magnetic pole for values. Only in the realm of MATERIAL values/development models are there alternative models, first and foremost China and the Gulf. In the spiritual realm, the momentum and energy are with reactionary values.
- From the West, bloodless and brain-dead managerial approaches reign (e.g., tweaking around the edges, modest initiatives, incrementalism, rather than attempts to confront entrenched problems directly) – as in the late Soviet Bloc. Failure and decline seem taken as a given by ruling elites, preventing catastrophic collapse means collaboration with the Dark Side. Their opponents live in – and get a charge out of – a reactionary fantasia (often involving time machine travel to an imagined halcyon, airbrushed past) or embrace redemption in dystopia.
Causes for Optimism
- There remains enormous potential in the region – ecological/natural-derived, agricultural, local talent. The latter is particularly pronounced with the Albanian demographic bubble – birth rates fell a lot, but still outstrip the rest of the region. Kosovo was noticeably younger and more energetic than Sandžak (which, in turn, is younger than most of the rest of Serbia).
- Demand Side: NOBODY seemed convinced of ANY political actors or options on the menu, even if especially worried (or particularly angry at/animated about) some actors.
- Supply Side: Given its unrivalled structural toolbox marshalled two decades ago, Western influence and leverage is still potentially potent. It continues to be squandered or misdirected. Western energies are wasted on false grails (“moving Serbia” geopolitically; the Dialogue {which the West maintains is merely stalled, not dead}; “making Dayton work,” inducing real reform toward durable structural accountability through the EU enlargement process, etc.), as well as unseemly self-seeking and credibility-killing pursuits like pursuing extraction in unrepresentative polities, as well as unimaginative and fatalist managerialism. The reactive approach to migration (as a “security” issue) belongs in this toxic brew as well.
Conclusions
- The entire region is in deficit of accountability and representation, as well as forward vision. Hope is either blind, or restricted to very small-scale application, often individual (I deduce for self-preservation/survival resilience).
- The West is not only not being constructive (even serving its own pragmatic medium-to-long-term interests) – it is actively fueling the popular deficits in democratic representation and hope, and therefore emigration/brain drain. Absent a coherent forward-looking vision for itself as a collective (from any quarter), let alone unity in its strategic pursuit, the West cedes the initiative to geopolitical and values adversaries.
- Self-Management – in a broader, philosophical sense of domestically directed societal development – never looked so good. Neither did actual representation, democratic self-government, and voluntary (e.g., not elite-driven) integration (or self-management units). The impetus for progress is far more likely to come from within these societies, from below, than it is from outside or above.
- The EU, US, and other established democracies are no longer concerned with democracy support, transformation, or progress in any recognizable sense. They MIGHT be jarred from the fence by shocks from within these societies, as with the 2016 Colorful Revolution in North Macedonia. But unless these pressures can be sustained – and/or there are allies in positions of executive power who seize the opportunity in Brussels, EU member state capitals, or Washington – the gravitation to managerialism is highly consistent.