Kurt Bassuener December 3rd, 2009

On October 1, the Clingendael Institute in The Hague and DPC hosted a policy roundtable entitled “The Future of International Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is the Strategy?,” involving policymakers from PIC members and policy analysts from Europe and North America.  It readily became that there was no strategy.  Two months later, the ill-planned and -executed “Butmir process,” announced on October 2nd, has collapsed.  The Clingendael roundtable proceedings,  linked here as a PDF document, can give readers a sense of why these talks were doomed to failure as devised.

The authors of the summary, Clingendael’s Marianne Rogier, the University of Amsterdam’s Maja Nenadovic, my colleague Bodo Weber and myself, also added a postscript to the summary, which I paste in its entirety below.

Postscript by the Authors

The round-table failed to produce concrete recommendations to be put forward to the next PIC meeting as initially envisaged by the organisers. However, we would like to seize the opportunity of this report to issue our own assessment of the current situation, taking into account the recently launched “Butmir process” and the last PIC steering board meeting in the form of a post-script. The following only represents the views if the authors of this report, and not the opinions expressed by the 1st October roundtable participants.

- The Dayton instruments, an executive OHR and operational Chapter VII EUFOR, must remain until BiH’s constitutional and governance structure has evolved to the point they are no longer required. There is no expiration date. Furthermore, these instruments should be used as needed. Since their credibility has been allowed to diminish, it may be necessary to resort to them to show BiH actors that the will is still there to use them.

- There is a clear necessity to differentiate the role of the High Representative from the EUSR. Both functions have different goals and require different tools to fulfil them. The OHR will remain until Bosnia shows itself consistently capable of functioning and reforming itself in the interest of its citizens. This is of particular importance at a time when attempts are being made against the territorial integrity of the state. The EUSR’s role is to support Bosnia’s EU integration process. Hopefully, both processes are self-reinforcing ones, and should go in parallel. We firmly believe that they should not be sequenced: Bosnia may still need the OHR while progressing on the European path. Both instruments may have to be reinforced, but not at the expense of each other. Furthermore, we believe that further clarification is needed on what type of mandate and power a “reinforced EUSR” will have. The EU is currently reorganising its foreign policy under the new Lisbon Treaty, and will have to come up with concrete proposals on what role it foresees for the EUSR in Bosnia.

- We note that the “5+ 2″ approach has been reaffirmed by the November meeting of the PIC Steering Board as the hurdle for OHR’s closure. We agree that no action to close the OHR should be undertaken so long as those conditions have not been fulfilled. We urge the PIC steering board members to hold this line, and not hollow-out these conditions for expediency’s sake, as has been the case with international conditionality with BiH before.

- International engagement must continue to achieve meaningful constitutional and governance reform, but should expand beyond the standard “let’s make a deal” approach with local political leaders. There needs to be a much more sustained, concerted effort to engage citizens directly on these issues in order to apply pressure from below on what amount to oligarchic and unrepresentative structures. The Bosnian population needs assurance that the country will not be allowed to dissolve, and nor will the necessary constitutional and governance reform be undertaken without popular consent. The EU and NATO also need to clarify what types of structural changes would need to be seen implemented (beyond the standard acquis communautaire) to achieve BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

In addition to these specific points, we would like to stress our deep concern regarding the current deteriorating situation in Bosnia and the lack of adequate response by the international community. We are profoundly worried at the indications that some wish to see the country partitioned, and fear that they might feel encouraged by the appeasing attitude advocated by some EU states. Have we forgotten that the main war aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to detach Republika Srpska from the rest of the country? If this is allowed 14 years after Dayton, after unprecedented international investment of political, human and financial capital to reconstruct a multiethnic, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, this would constitute an admission of ignominious defeat. Such a policy would reward ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the heart of Europe and with the support of the European Union. Is this the message that we want to send to future generations and to the world ridden with other secessionist conflicts? Can the EU’s still nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy afford such a resounding failure on its own doorstep?

Bosnia can not be compared to Kosovo or Montenegro. There is no valid argument, either political or legal, to support Republika Srpska’s independence. Furthermore, such a process would not be a peaceful one: it would most certainly throw the whole region back into conflict and instability. It is thus time to take a resolute stand to protect the peace that we have been building in the past 14 years, to protect the values for which the European Union stands, and to avoid any further conflicts in the region.

Sarajevo, The Hague, Amsterdam, Hanover, 27 November 2009.

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Kurt Bassuener November 18th, 2009

On Monday, the online journal Global Europe published an op-ed by DPC Senior Associates Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener calling for German and American leadership on Bosnia policy.  Among the recommendations was the separation of the High Representative, who has a peace enforcement role, from the EU Special Representative, who has an EU enlargement facilitation role.  The article notes the potential of Germany to lead the EU out of its current policy dead-end.

The full article can be found online here.

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Kurt Bassuener June 9th, 2009

Following the publication of an op-ed in the New York Times by former US Ambassador to Serbia and Croatia William Montgomery that advocated partition of Bosnia and Kosovo, DPC Senior Associate Kurt Bassuener was invited by Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje to comment.  The following article appeared in the paper’s June 9 edition.  This is the original English language version.

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Dangerous Policy Vacuum Leaves Space for Unfulfilled Agendas

By Kurt Bassuener

Last Friday, William Montgomery, former US Ambassador to Croatia and Serbia, advocated in the New York Times an “achievable” US policy toward Kosovo and Bosnia: partitioning them along ethnic lines.  This is essentially what Dobrica ?osi? and other Serbian nationalist theorists have advocated for some time.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, when postwar Bosnia was stagnating, such arguments were heard more often.  It was a flawed prescription then, as it is now. Montgomery alludes to the reality that partition would be accompanied by violence when he mentions a need for “demonstrated will and readiness to use force to prevent violence along the way.”  And violence we would see, both in BiH and in Kosovo, if this policy were actively pursued.

But the global environment and the international posture in Bosnia is much different than it was in say 1998.  For this reason, Montgomery’s article could not have come at a better time for those who wish to present BiH as an “impossible country.”  The faux simplicity of Ambassador Montgomery’s proposal is what makes it dangerously seductive to those who simply wish to be done with it. 

Bosnia and Hercegovina is far from a lost cause.  But arriving at a system that can make it work won’t be easy.  No durable solution in the country can be achieved without a consensus on what the state can be, and how it can meet popular needs for security and functioning, accountable governance. 

The current constitutional and structural system designed to maximize opacity and unaccountability.  Regardless of their varying views on the full range of issues, that is one common foundation for all members of the political cartel in BiH.  Pressing the nerves of fear and mistrust has kept them in their comfortable positions; they have little incentive to develop a functioning democratic system. 

The real question for the international community is how to ensure the necessary stability for those Bosnians who do want to make their country work to have a chance to come to accord.  This means maintaining an ability to prevent further deterioration while adopting a strategy to promote the necessary popular accommodation to arrive at a functional system.

Despite the big bang of Vice President Joe Biden’s visit and his direct statements to the BiH Parliament, there remains no clarity in international approach.  Bosnian politics went back to business as usual in days, with politicians predictably approaching Biden’s speech as a smorgasbord, picking out (and spinning) the elements they thought favorable to their positions and ignoring what they didn’t like.  There has been no follow up from Washington since.

The most likely way to catalyze a common approach is through a US presidential special envoy.  However, Biden said in an interview to this newspaper Friday that none was forthcoming.  The US remains stuck still hoping to follow an EU lead, should one materialize. None is visible on the horizon.

Only leadership by EU member states can move the Brussels bureaucracy, which thinks it has arrived at a magic formula that need only be applied.  Without any members proposing a strategy, the Brussels bureaucratic sausage machine will generate more lowest-common-denominator policies with no prospects of success. 

While the US cannot run an effective policy in Bosnia without the EU, only the US can galvanize a coherent strategy among its members.  Vague articulations of “the European path” and various process checklists are no substitute. 

There needs to be a clear articulation of what sort of Bosnia the EU will accept into the fold. The international community must commit that any such solution would have to obtain qualified majority consent of all Bosnia’s constituent peoples, as well as those “others” who are effectively second-class citizens in the Dayton system.  This will end speculation that some “Dayton II” is in the works that will impose a solution. The EU and US both need to state that will help facilitate the process by which a working consensus is reached. To make the discussion possible, the determination to maintain the guardrails that have averted implosion in Bosnia for 13 years remains essential.  That means retaining an operationally credible EUFOR and the legal platform, though not necessarily the office, of the High Representative.

The only fixation of the EU and most of its members regarding Bosnia, including the incoming Swedish presidency, is “transition” – closing the OHR and inaugurating a “reinforced” EUSR.  This is touted as an end in itself.  Aside from the amount of personnel EUSR will likely have, there is still no clarity on what this mission would actually aim to achieve.  In theory, this “reinforced” EUSR could be a positive development, if launched after full completion of 5+2 and if designed and equipped for the Bosnian reality.  Yet it seems the main goal is to divest itself of any power, and therefore responsibility should Bosnia fail. While not a policy design, the essence of Montgomery’s vision might arrive by default, with the attendant consequences.

The costs of failure – human, moral, and financial – would be massive and enduring for the EU – and the US as well.  The EU must recognize that the bill would land on its doorstep.  The reality is that the EU would have to devote far more troops than it currently fields to manage a carve-up, and it would be a far more dangerous mission for them, given that many Bosnians would see them as complicit. 

Even with a coherent strategy and the will to see it through, there is no guarantee of success.  Ultimately, if Bosnia’s citizens cannot agree on a way to make the country work, it cannot.  But under the current system, they haven’t had that chance.  Given the stakes, the international community owes Bosnia and its own taxpayers a full-bore effort to allow them that opportunity.  Once again, only American leadership can prevent a broader international failure.

Kurt Bassuener is a Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion.

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Kurt Bassuener June 9th, 2009

USIPeace Briefing - Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is to be Done?

On April 3rd, DPC Senior Associates Kurt Bassuener and James Lyon attended a policy briefing on international policy toward Bosnia and Hercegovina hosted by the US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. 

In late May, USIP published a USIPeace Briefing written by Bassuener and Lyon reviewing both the proceedings and then presenting the authors’ view on what the US-EU joint strategy must be.  This paper was followed by two papers with alternate points of view on the necessary approach - also available at the link above.  Bassuener and Lyon’s briefing is available in PDF format above.

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Kurt Bassuener February 25th, 2009

DPC Senior Associate James Lyon penned an op-ed published in today’s International Herald Tribune on the deterioriating situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina, “Halting the downward spiral.”  In his article, he summarizes the threat:

Inexplicably, the European Union and the United States pursue policies that could all but guarantee Bosnia will revert to war. A new conflict in Bosnia could have unwanted consequences for Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, and would result not only in loss of life, destruction of property, refugee flows and the abolishment of Bosnia’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, but also would create serious rifts within NATO and destroy all pretense of EU common foreign policy. It could cause Balkan states to turn their backs on European integration and seek closer ties with Russia.

…and also the feeble international response:

In response to the escalating threat, the United States has withdrawn its general from NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, while the EU has reduced its peacekeeping force (Eufor) to approximately 2,100 troops, and announced impending withdrawals of 500 more, along with the withdrawal of its only airworthy helicopters. Eufor stopped patrolling in 2007, amid complaints that its troops were bored. France, Finland, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland are all rushing for the exits.

The international community appears to be on autopilot as it rushes to close the international supervisory mission in Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative, leaving only the European Union Special Representative, with an uncertain mandate and weak powers, as the leading international presence. Many EU members seem convinced, and the U.S. appears to hope, that the transition to a weak EU special representative will create momentum and somehow motivate Bosnia’s politicians to change their behavior.

He advocates the following remedy:

Bosnia’s backward slide can be halted with few new resources, but it will take outside-the-box thinking. This will include Washington re-engaging and appointing a special presidential envoy to the Balkans, who can help the Western alliance focus policies and deliver consistent messages. It also requires a robust office of the EU special representative and that the EU take the threat seriously and make Eufor a capable deterrent. Most of all, it requires a long-term commitment to state-building in Bosnia. Too much has been invested and too much is at stake to continue with current policies.

In the same issue of the Herald Tribune, NY Times reporter Dan Bilefsky reports on the fallout from a criminal investigation launched against Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik:

 Dodik expressed indignation over the weekend, saying he was the victim of a witch hunt aimed at undermining him and the Bosnian Serb Republic. “Even the little faith I had in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is now lost due to this farce with the criminal charges against me,” he said Saturday. “They have made this country pointless.”…

Dodik also vented his ire at a meeting Saturday in Mostar, where leaders of Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups were discussing how to press forward with changes to the constitution. Attendees at the meeting said Dodik stormed out after one hour. Before leaving, they said, he delivered an ultimatum that a new constitution could only proceed if it affirmed the right of the Bosnian Serb Republic to national self-determination and enshrined its right to hold a referendum on independence.

He also quoted Bosnian political analyst Srecko Latal:

“The United States and the European Union must engage, not just for the sake of Bosnia, but because the world can’t afford to allow what happened the last time,” Latal said in an interview. While Bosnia is patrolled by a 2,000-strong EU peacekeeping force, he said it was not strong enough if hostilities erupted.

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Kurt Bassuener February 20th, 2009

DPC Policy Brief - How to Pull-Out of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Dead-End calls for strong leadership of and tools for the “reinforced” European Union Special Representative (EUSR) mission to follow closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  The brief notes the rising climate of fear and uncertainty in the country must be arrested by the international community to stop the slide toward conflict.  The paper also argues that only by confronting the constitutional reform issue can the EU assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in meeting EU standards.

 To the EU:
1) Appoint a politically capable leader as High Representative/EUSR.
2) Articulate clear constitutional reform guidelines and make constitutional reform the core of the EUSR mandate.
3) Give the EUSR executive authority to confront anti-Dayton activity.
4) Ensure that EUFOR has credible operational capacity throughout the country to deter and respond to threats to public security and the Dayton Peace Accords.
5) Authorize the EUSR to decide on fulfilment of EU conditions and all sanctions.
6) Ensure EUSR possesses anti-organized crime and corruption investigative capacity.
7) Maintain a broad international coalition in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To the Peace Implementation Council:
8) Insist on full completion of the 5+2 formula prior to closing OHR.

To the US:
9) Appoint a Presidential Special Envoy to the Balkans to demonstrate US engagement and promote international policy cohesion.
10) Post a US flag officer in the NATO HQ Sarajevo to identify training and exercise opportunities.

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