More on Eric’s post below, case of Egypt

Kurt Bassuener October 3rd, 2008

Soon after Eric posted the link below to the excellent Joshua Kurlantzick article, “Monster’s Ball,” the two of us discussed some of the themes therein.  The reliance on particular leaders seems a constant and repeated error throughout American statecraft, nearly always ending in tears.

One factor seems very clear to me - that the Bush administration was far more concerned with having talking points to buttress the assertion that “freedom (was) on the march,” even before his second inaugural address, than it was with the adherence to democratic principles. Furthermore, it conflates “democratic” with “pro-Western,” or “pro-American,” and these don’t always go hand in hand.  And when a regime is undemocratic and aligned with the US, it’s a safe bet the population will rightly see the US as complicit in their oppression.  The primary concern, despite all discussion of the paradigm shift away from backing “our SOBs” that came with Bush’s 2003 NED address, has been to have governments aligned with the US.

Post-Rose Revolutionary Georgia in particular came at an opportune time for the Bush administration, which was scrambling to find another rationale for the invasion of Iraq.  So the Saakashvili administration and the Bush administration were in a symbiosis, with Washington not wanting to point to Georgia’s increasing bellicosity or democratic transgressions, both of which might have been reined-in with a bit of friendly pressure early on.  The fact that they were not helped lead to the debacle of August’s “five day war” with Russia, which saw the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia leave Georgia’s orbit - even before the war legally Georgian territory but not under physical control - probably for good.  But Bush was happy to adopt and keep Georgia as a poster child - never mind the more complicated reality.  Georgia of course deserved support, but not uncritical support.

Yet the sorts of blatant hypocritical mistakes that gutted the credibility of the “freedom agenda” from the start were, as Kurlantzick notes, the relationships with such “friendly dictators” as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, recipient of $2 billion a year in guaranteed aid.  That massive potential US leverage has never been employed to press Mubarak’s brutal and sclerotic regime to open up, and is the subject of a fascinating new book, Inside Egypt - The Land of the Pharoahs on the Brink of a Revolution, by John R. Bradley (recently banned in Egypt, natch).

Near the close of his angry book, Bradley cites the bizarre position of Egypt’s beleagured liberal democrats with a recounting of the experience of Hisham Kassem, winner of the National Endowment for Democracy’s Democracy Award a year ago:

These conflicting goals (democracy and transparency along with stability) were captured in the rather bizarre experience of one Hisham Kassem, an Egyptian human rights activist who, in October 2007, was one of four international activists given the prestigious Democracy Award of the National Endowment for Democracy.  Kassem found the experience woefully depressing. “To see the president of the United States in person and his more or less lack of interest in what is happening politically in Egypt left me without any doubt that this whole [democracy] program was over,” he told Reuters after collecting his award.  Kassem said that although the president asked about reformers in the ruling NDP (to which he replied “Sorry, there are no reformers in the NDP”), Bush was mainly interested in the position of Islamists in Egypt.  Kassem made clear that the government had made it impossible for secular movements to operate, leaving the field open to the Islamists: “There is no alternative now for the people, given that that Islamists operate out of mosques while secular parties are not allowed to operate at all.” With the difficult economic situation, he added, “I am worried Egypt will become a theocracy by 2010.” Apparently that comment finally got Bush’s full attention, and he seemed rather perplexed that American policy was not working, noting: “We give your country $2 billion a year in order to keep it stable and prevent it from turning into a theocracy.”  He looked, Kassem said, quite dismayed.

Some would argue Kassem did himself no favors in meeting with Bush and his top advisors.  For the unfortunate reality is that the American push for democracy is now perceived as having been insincere at best, hypocritical at worst.  Which is hardly surprising, when for the president the purpose of the payoff to Mubarak’s regime is stability rather than reform.

Bradley further quotes another Egyptian human rights activist, Ahmed Said al-Islam, as saying:

The war on terror is undermining democracy advocates and strengthening Arab dictatorships…The latter are using it to put off reforms and arguing that being pro-reform means siding with the enemies of the state.

American credibility in democracy promotion is so denuded after the Bush years that respected Carnegie Endowment scholar Tom Carothers says it needs to be ”decontaminated” to regain credibility in a new administration.  Harsh words, but apropos, I believe. 

The US, having beat the democracy drum so loudly, is front and center in being cited for hypocrisy, but sadly not alone. In the case of Egypt, French President Sarkozy asked Mubarak to co-chair the Mediterranean Union summit last summer - though it’s fair to note that none of the potential members from the southern littoral of the Mediterranean really fits the bill as a democracy.  The larger point to be made is that the democratic world has no clear strategy to employ the leverage it has to promote its values.  The US and EU remain divided on democracy support largely because the Bush administration has shot its credibility on the subject.

No matter what the result of the US presidential election, the bottom line is that the EU and the US have to collaborate in that endeavor if it is to bear fruit and help reverse authoriarian capitalism’s increasing appeal.

Putin snubs French - again

Kurt Bassuener September 21st, 2008

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin today met with French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, and was adamant that only the “states” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, together with Russia, would determine Russian force levels in the two breakaway regions of Georgia.

“As you know, we recognised South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence in the same way as many European countries recognized Kosovo’s independence,” he told Russian TV.

“The question of our armed forces’ presence on these territories will be agreed on bilateral basis, in line with international law and on the basis of agreements between Russia and the states in question.”

This was another humiliation for France, as it directly contravened a six-point ceasefire deal hammered out by President Sarkozy between Georgia and Russia. 

As part of the deal Russia agreed that its troops should return to pre-conflict positions.

Moscow has already announced plans to keep about 8,000 troops in the regions - far more than were there previously.

Today South Ossetian forces paraded in captured Georgian military equipment, including US-manufactured Humvees, in commemoration of its independence day.

Aside from Russia, only Nicaragua recognizes South Ossetian or Abkhazian independence.  An effort last month by President Medvedev to get the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, China, and Central Asian states to endorse Russia’s action did not achieve the desired result for Russia.  Even Belarus, which was chastised by Russian diplomats for being insufficiently supportive of Moscow’s invasion, has yet to recognize the two regions as independent, though it claims it intends to do so.  One wonders where Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who just hosted a pair of Russian Tupolev “Blackjack” bombers, and Cuban leader Raul Castro are on this…

France and EU warming to Mauritanian junta?

Eric Witte September 17th, 2008

As I noted last month, EU Aid and Development Commissioner Loius Michel was requesting suspension of a 75 million Euro/year fishing agreement with Mauritania in a bid to step up international pressure on the illegitimate regime following the August 6 coup.  The issue was set to be discussed by the Council of the European Union this month.  The September meeting of EU foreign ministers has come and gone, and it appears that the fishing agreement remains intact.  In place of anything consequential, EU foreign ministers did agree, however, to begin “consultations” and a “constructive dialogue” with the Mauritanian junta. 

Meanwhile, representatives of the French EU presidency met with Ramtane Lamamra, the African Union’s Commissioner for Peace and Security.  According to a statement by EU Presidency, they agreed on these points:

- the need for the immediate release of President Abdallahi and for the institutions to resume normal operations;

- the need to work towards a solution to the crisis with the agreement of the different Mauritanian parties;

- the readiness of the African Union, the European Union, and the International Organization of la Francophonie to accompany Mauritania’s efforts in this direction.

That’s thin gruel compared to last month’s tough talk about withdrawal of the lucrative fishing deal.  Is it too cynical to recall in this context that France is one of the five EU member states whose fishing fleets are allowed access to Mauritania’s rich waters under that deal?

EU to weigh freezing Mauritanian fishing deal

Eric Witte August 18th, 2008

As I noted on Friday, suspension of international aid to Mauritania following the coup earlier this month may have a limited impact on the junta so long as lucrative fishing and mining contracts continue to fund the government.  Today, a spokesperson for the European Commission said that EU Aid and Development Commissioner Louis Michel will propose to the European Council that non-humanitarian aid and the fishing agreement worth Euro 75.25 million per year be frozen until there is an acceptable solution to the crisis.  Mauritania will be on the agenda when the Council (foreign ministers of the 27 EU members) meets in September.  The governments to watch are those of France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece - those whose fishing fleets have access to Mauritanian waters under the agreement in question.

Fishing (and mining) for EU leverage in Mauritania

Eric Witte August 15th, 2008

Following last week’s coup in Mauritania, the United States quickly suspended non-humanitarian aid and the African Union suspended Mauritania’s membership, signaling a promising coordinated defense of Mauritania’s young democracy.  On Monday, France followed suit in suspending non-humanitarian aid.  The  European Commission appeared to be working in the same direction, but leaving itself wiggle room.  European Voice reported on Tuesday [subscription req’d]:

“A spokesperson for Louis Michel, European commissioner in charge of development, told European Voice that the EU executive is preparing to launch formal consultations with Mauritania, under the Cotonou agreement which governs the relationship between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. The agreement foresees the launch of such consultations when countries breach principles of democracy and respect for human rights. The spokesperson said that ‘the potential of suspension [of development aid] is there’, if the discussions do not produce satisfactory results.”

With international pressure mounting, things might seem bleak for the coup plotters who overthrew President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. 

Or do they? 

Reuters reports that international companies involved in extracting natural resources in Mauritania remain unperturbed by the coup.  Their activities continue unhindered, and now provide remittances to an illegitimate government.  Extraction in the areas of oil, gas and uranium are relatively young, meaning that the coup has occured as exploration is giving way to more lucrative production.  The same Reuters report notes that Chinese demand is driving up prices for iron ore, so this staple of the Mauritanian economy is producing record profits.

In an additional bit of good news for General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and other members of the junta, just five days before seizing power, a four-year fishing agreement between the European Union and Mauritania came into effect.  In exchange for access to Mauritanian waters for fishing vessels from Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Greece, the EU will pay Mauritania EUR 76.25 million per year.  The $23 million (about EUR 15 million) in suspended American assistance to Mauritania suddenly seems less impressive.

Yesterday, the junta named a former Mauritanian ambassador to the European Union, Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf, as prime minister.  Reuters quotes an anonymous diplomat saying, “Internationally speaking it’s a strategic nomination because he is pro-European and he knows how Brussels works.”  But it gets worse.  Digging deeper into Laghdaf’s background, Agence de Presse Africaine reports that he has specific experience in coordinating European support for natural resource extraction in Mauritania:

“He worked as an international consultant between 1997 and 2000 and before that as an expert at the Centre for Industrial Development (TDCI) of the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) states and the European Union (1991-1997).

He was in charge of selecting adapted technologies for the development of ores at the TDCI, searching for European partners and institutions to finance identified projects.

He was in charge of developing the mining resources of the ACP states, particularly the implementation of the mining and industrial part of the Lome Convention.

He wrote and published practical guides on increasing the value of mining resources of the ACP states and developing the phosphates of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali and Togo.”

It appears that to really pressure the putchists, the European Union and its member states will have to prioritize the defense of democracy over mercantilism and parochial interests. 

Putin’s master plan - all upsides for Moscow

Kurt Bassuener August 11th, 2008

Al Jazeera English just reported that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili just signed a ceasefire agreement with the French and Finnish Foreign Ministers, Bernard Kouchner and Alexander Stubb.  It has reportedly already been rejected by Russia.  The two men are now touring bomb damage in Gori on live TV with their Georgian counterpart.  They reportedly had to duck and cover from a Russian bombing sortie.

How much traction he will get with it is far from clear.  This action by Russia, while given a pretext by the Tskhinvali operation by the Georgians, was clearly in the works for some time, given the weight of force applied and the wide spread area of operations.  As Eric Witte noted earlier, the Russian government has been open about the desire to see Saakashvili ousted.  Vitali Churkin, the Russian UN Ambassador, said the following yesterday in a sharp exchange with US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad:

Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador, accused Moscow of seeking “regime change” in Georgia and resisting attempts to make peace after days of deadly fighting.

“Is your government’s objective regime change in Georgia, the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Georgia?” Khalilzad asked Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador.

Churkin said “regime change is an American expression. We do not use such an expression”.

But he added: “But sometimes there are occasions, and we know from history, that there are different leaders who come to power, either democratically or semi-democratically, and they become an obstacle.”

Putin, who is clearly and literally calling the shots, has only upsides from this increasingly ambitious attack within Georgia.  He bet - correctly - that there would be no active military response from the outside (and none is foreseeable).  He managed to paint Saakashvili as rash and irresponsible.  He is betting that ultimately Georgian domestic support for the government will wane as Russia continues its assault.  And he’s betting that this war will not only reduce the likelihood of Georgia getting into NATO, but reduce NATO and American credibility in Russia’s “near abroad” and beyond.  The US and NATO may come to be seen as an unreliable ally.

Georgians have asked what their troop deployment to Iraq got them, now that the US is not intervening in Georgia.  This is a fair and understandable question.   The term “ally” has been devalued in the past seven years through the Bush administration’s “with us or against us” approach, and expectation that NATO applicants should send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq - the latter a war none of these countries had a voice in choosing.  Allies are supposed to consult and listen to each other, and take each other’s interests into account before engaging in a conflict.  It is doubtful that Saakashvili did so before he sent troops into Tskhinvali.  Neither Tblisi or Washington had apparently planned for this eventuality, despite it being foreseeable. 

All the opprobrium of the international community has not made a dent in Russia’s plan to crush Georgia. 

ICG warns on Guinea

Eric Witte June 24th, 2008

The International Crisis Group released a briefing today on the situation in Guinea (so far only available in French, but an English overview is available here).  ICG warns that after firing Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté last month, President Lansana Conté is poised to restore his full dictatorship. The briefing calls on the international community to increase pressure on Conté and new Prime Minister Tidiane Souré, pressing them to proceed with holding credible legislative elections in December, and follow through on promises to hold accountable those responsible for the violence in January-February 2007 that claimed around 200 lives. Without significant moves to reform and stabilize the state, ICG warns that the risk of a coup and attendant ethnic strife likely will increase.

Alas, the international community - notably the Economic Community of West African States, African Union, France, European Union, United States and Canada - remain inexplicably disengaged.

Olympic torch relay turns into a public relations nightmare for China

Eric Witte April 7th, 2008

Despite 3,000 police and other security measures, the Olympic torch was extinguished three times in Paris and the Tibetan flag was flown briefly from the Parisian city hall today, following similar protests in London.  China’s economic, diplomatic and demographic weight may make it difficult for democratic governments to make protest of the crackdown in Tibet (or Darfur, or…) a top issue in their relationships with Beijing.  (This was perhaps in evidence over the weekend when the French government distanced itself from remarks on Tibet attributed to President Sarkozy.)  But China may be learning that it will be impossible to control popular sentiment around the world.  Indeed, the Olympic torch relay appears to be turning into a “Free Tibet” relay.

Update: Even before the Olympic torch arrives in northern California, protesters today scaled the Golden Gate Bridge to hang “Free Tibet” banners and a Tibetan flag. 

Briefly noted…

Eric Witte April 5th, 2008

  • Morgan Tsvangirai, the Movement for Democratic Change candidate for Zimbabwe’s presidency, is warning that President Robert Mugabe is preparing to deploy his security forces around the country to intimidate the population ahead of a run-off vote as the election commission still has not released official results from the first round. With Zimbabwe on edge and the MDC calling for international action to prevent violence, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, which surely has the greatest external leverage over Mugabe, is arguing that “it’s the time to wait.” Mbeki has been waiting in deference to Mugabe ever since he succeeded Nelson Mandela.
  • According to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Burma’s proposed new constitution has leaked to the press and public. It would leave the military in ultimate control and ban Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from the presidency. How will the international community respond if this report is accurate?
  • French authorities have arrested Mohammed Bacar, the renegade leader of Comoros who refused to leave power and prompted an intervention by the African Union and Comoran troops. Bacar was arrested in the French territory if Reunion following an extradition request from the Comoran government.
  • France’s Human Rights Minister, Rama Yade, is denying that she told the newspaper Le Monde that President Nicolas Sarkozy had placed three conditions on his attendance at the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics - all related to Tibet. Meanwhile Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, is calling on President George W. Bush to consider boycotting the opening ceremonies. According to the New York Times, Pelosi said “that if the International Olympic Committee wanted to portray the Games as a gathering that transcends sports, its members should hold the host country to high human rights standards.” The White House continues to insist that Bush will attend.

What does the Comoros intervention say about the African Union?

Eric Witte March 30th, 2008

African Union (AU) peacekeeping in Sudan’s vast Darfur region has not gone well, hobbled by a lack of capacity, insufficient western support, and absent unity of purpose. By contrast, last week the organization was successful in intervening in the tiny Indian Ocean archipelago nation of Comoros. An AU military contingent joined Comoran government forces in prevailing against a small, poorly equipped rebel opponent. The rebel leader was successfully ousted, and may yet face justice in Comoros.

The low threshold of this military success casts doubt on its meaning for greater African ability to engage in peacemaking, peacekeeping and democratization exercises in more daunting contexts. But the strange mix of motives within the AU for intervention in the Comoros represents perhaps an even greater challenge in to future AU deployments in support of democratic governments.

A brief look at the context of the intervention helps in explaining some of the motives for intervention among various AU members.

Under the 2001 constitution, each of three Comoran islands (Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli) has its own president and broad autonomy; the three presidents are vice presidents in the Comoros Union. A federal presidency rotates among the islands every four years, and is currently held by Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi, a moderate Islamist from Anjouan educated in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, who was elected in May 2006.  Sambi’s election, deemed free and fair by international observers, represented the first peaceful transition of power in Comoros in 30 years.

The current crisis in Comoros began in May last year, when armed loyalists of Col. Mohamed Bacar seized the capital of Anjouan island ahead of sham elections (replete with self-printed ballots) that extended Bacar’s term as the island’s president. After the country’s constitutional court declared the Anjouan election invalid, Bacar’s forces shot and killed two Comoran government soldiers attempting to enforce the ruling.

Until 2001, Comoros had been one of the most unstable countries in Africa since independence from France in 1975. There had been at least 18 coups, several of which were launched by the French mercenary Bob Denard, and some of which were supported by the French government. France frowned on Comoran claims to the fourth main island in the archipelago, Mayotte. Mayotte remains under French administration in accordance with a 1974 referendum.

This week’s AU-Comoran invasion of Anjouan, following months of efforts to resolve the crisis by other means and numerous unheeded warnings to Bacar and his cronies, is a positive development for the fragile young democracy in Comoros. And, indeed, the government of Tanzania, which contributed 750 troops to the effort, has cited the need for truly democratic elections on Anjouan as a rationale for its participation.

But what of the motivations of Libya and Sudan, the other two AU participants in the military intervention? Their despotic regimes surely take no interest in defending democracy in Africa, much less setting a precedent for its spread.

Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi is today the leading proponent of Pan-Africanism on the continent. As I wrote in European Voice last July when Gaddafi was pressing AU heads of government to agree to political union at a summit in Accra:

“Gaddafi’s past stabs at Pan-African politics have included the training and arming of a West African warlord network including former Liberian President Charles Taylor, Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compoaré, and the notorious limb-amputating Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. Taylor currently faces a war crimes trial for his role in a plot that involved the export of Sierra Leone’s diamonds through Libya. From 1973 to 1987 Libya occupied a uranium-rich strip of Chad. In 2002 the Central African Republic’s teetering government rewarded Libyan military support with a 99-year concession for its gold, diamonds and suspected oil reserves.

In turn, Gaddafi has transformed Africa’s natural resources, including Libya’s own considerable oil wealth, into a lifeline for African dictators under pressure. It is no wonder that Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe was among those cheering the colonel in Accra.

If Africa were unified, Gaddafi would accurately represent the state of governance in most of its countries today: intolerant of political dissent, free media and minority groups, corrupt and afraid to submit to free and fair elections.”

Gaddafi likely saw three attractions in the Comoros intervention, in order of probable importance:

  • It provided a sense of momentum to the African Union, his preferred vehicle for African unity.
  • It ended any temptation that former colonial power France might have to intervene.
  • Gaddafi can now likely count on political support from a grateful Comoran government (limited in its weight as it is) for his ambitions to lead the Pan-African project.

Sudan’s regime contributed 150 troops to the Comoros intervention.  Khartoum has long been engaged in a series of conflicts pitting desire for central control of power and resources against resistance to this on the peripheries of the vast country.  As the International Crisis Group has extensively reported, in addition to the North-South conflict and Darfur, this dynamic applies to Khartoum’s conflicts in Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile.

In the case of Darfur, the underpowered AU observation/peacekeeping force long served the Sudanese government as a shield to stave off introduction of a potentially more potent UN or even NATO force.

So for Khartoum, the Comoros intervention was likely attractive because it:

  • came to the aid of a central government asserting control over a rebellious federal unit;
  • and strengthened the perception of the AU as a credible alternative intervention force in Africa, which may undercut the perceived legitimacy of future interventions on the continent by non-African forces, even those operating under a United Nations umbrella.

There is certainly nothing bad per se about a desire to see enhanced AU unity and operational capacity. But there seems to be a fundamental divide between African democrats and despots with regard to what the AU should be, and what ends its operations should serve. The AU could use added capacity to protect democratic governments from insurgent warlords and would-be dictators, or it could serve interventions in support of leaders who happen to be favored by powerful AU leaders, and occasionally as a political shield to prevent external intervention in the worst of the continent’s politically induced calamities.

Rarely are these visions likely to overlap and create the requisite impetus for action, as they did this past week in Comoros.

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