Iryna Chupryna April 25th, 2010

Little more that 50 days have passed since the inauguration of Viktor Yanukovych, but his Presidency has already brought two immense surprises in Ukraine’s foreign policy. The first was the pledge to the U.S. President, Barack Obama, to get rid of Ukraine’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium by 2012. The second was even more astonishing – according to the deal sealed between Viktor Yanukovych and the Russian President, Dmitriy Medvedev, on April 21 in Kharkiv, Ukraine has agreed to give Moscow a 25-year extension on the lease of its Black Sea naval fleet base in Sevastopol, keeping it on Ukrainian sovereign territory until at least 2042. Instead, Ukraine supposedly gets a 30 percent discount on the price of its natural gas imports from Russia – allowing affordable energy prices that feed the nation’s gas-consuming steel and chemical industries. Viktor Yanukovych said the deal will bring savings of $40 billion to Ukraine this decade.

However, most of Ukraine’s opposition politicians, including the former President Viktor Yushchenko and the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, have condemned the deal as a dangerous move infringing strategic Ukraine’s interests. First of all, the agreement violates against the Article 17 of the Ukraine’s Constitution that bans the placement of foreign troops on Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko had persistently sought to expel the Russian fleet after its current lease expires in 2017. Second, with the Russian fleet staged on its territory, Ukraine will hardly be able to join the NATO at least until 2042 – a period that seems an eternity for representatives from younger generations in Ukraine, most of whom support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Last but not least, Crimea, where the Russian fleet is staged, has large Russian population and is a potentially separatist region. The presence of the Russian fleet does not allow fully overcoming this threat.

Our Ukraine, the political party which ex-President Viktor Yushchenko heads, has already called for the impeachment of Yanukovych. “A president who has violated the norms of the Ukrainian Constitution that forbids foreign military bases on Ukrainian territory should be impeached. Yanukovych’s team is evidently preparing to give the Russians Ukraine’s last strategic resources: aviation production, atomic energy and underground gas depositories,” - according to the party’s statement.

The economic advantages from the agreement also seem dubious.
First, it appears that the chief beneficiaries of the lower-priced natural gas imports will be powerful oligarchs who own chemical and metallurgic plants in Ukraine. Most of them are members of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and sponsors of his electoral campaign, therefore, the deal may have been the repayment of Yanukovych’s debt to his powerful sponsors.  Instead of modernizing chemical and steel enterprises, they clearly prefer to give up national interests for cheaper gas prices.
Second, the so-called 30 percent discount actually only brings the import price closer to its true market value. The price Ukraine has paid for gas since the deal concluded by Yulia Tymoshenko (450 USD) last year was the highest in Europe.

This Kharkiv deal allowing Russia to keep its navy in Ukraine’s Crimea for another 25 years has spurred public discontent across Ukraine. On Saturday, several thousand Ukrainians have rallied in front of parliament to protest against it. The crowd was addressed, among other, by Yulia Tymoshenko and Viacheslav Kirilenko – the politicians who sharply criticized each other during the presidential campaign. Thus, the protest against the foreign policy pursued by the new President can bring the unity against former political rivals within the opposition camp.

The agreement has been submitted to Ukraine’s parliament for ratification on Tuesday, April 27, the same day it will be considered in Russia’s State Duma. Several opposition leaders have claimed they would block parliamentary proceedings on Tuesday and called for mass demonstrations.

A protest movement has also started in Internet among young Ukrainians. Among the communities uniting young people who don’t want to leave in a “semi-sovereign” Ukraine, the community “Protest action against the Russian Fleet in Ukraine” includes those who participated in the protest action on Saturday (http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/event.php?eid=111301532243192).

The April 27, when the agreement is due for ratification in Ukraine’s parliament, will become a moment of truth both for Ukraine’s opposition and civil society.  Similarly to the aftermath of the rigged presidential elections in 2004, now it will depend on Ukrainian people whether they will be able to stand up against the disregard for their will and the violation against the Constitutional norms.

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Iryna Chupryna February 19th, 2010

On February 7, 2010, the former heroine of the Orange Revolution and the current prime minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, and the opposition leader who was defeated in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, competed in the second round of the presidential run-off took place in Ukraine. In the first round, Yanukovych won over Tymoshenko with the 10 percent lead (35.32 % and 25.05 % of votes). Till the very last moment the intrigue shaped the election campaign – will Tymoshenko manage to reduce the gap and even win? But the miracle did not happen. The prime minister whom many blame for the severe economic crisis in Ukraine fell short of the victory. She received 45.47 % of votes, while Viktor Yanukovych – 48. 95%. Tymoshenko made a remarkable progress compared to the first round gaining additional 20 % of votes, but this was not enough for realizing her dream.

The first post-Orange presidential elections in Ukraine were marked by some salient trends exposing the disappointment of Ukrainian voters that replaced the enthusiasm and idealism of the participants of the Orange Revolution in 2004. Namely, the turnout in the run-off was only 69.07 percent. While a decent figure by Western standards, in Ukraine this has become the lowest level of electoral participation since the presidential elections in 1999 (in 1999 turnout was 73.8, in 2004 – 77,32 %). It cannot be ruled out that among more than 30 percent of voters who ignored the presidential race, the protest electorate represented a substantial share.

The high percentage of those who voted against the two candidates (there is a legal option to vote “against all” in a ballot) - 4.36 percent, - is definitely an even more convincing evidence of the growing disappointment with two main contenders for presidency. It is peculiar that although Tymoshenko lost to Yanukovych in view of general number of votes in her support, she won in more regions. She took the lead in 16 regions and in Kyiv, while Yanukovych – in 8 regions of Ukraine, as well as in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. This is explained by the fact that southern and eastern regions where Yanukovych won are more densely populated than the western ones.

Why did Tymoshenko lose to Yanukovych who is less eloquent, attractive and steadfast politician, who was twice criminally convicted before? The reason is probably that she managed to alienate many of voters in the Western and Central Ukraine that was a stronghold for Yuschenko and “orange” political forces. In 2009, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (ByUT) together with the Party of Regions developed a constitutional reform project that was aimed to share the power in the country between only two political forces and to exclude any other, but the project failed due to the unwillingness of Yanukovych to become a figurehead president. In August 2008, Tymoshenko did not protest against the Russia’s aggression towards Georgia. She was responsible for the new gas contracts with Russia that proved to be very disadvantageous to Ukraine and contributed to the huge growth of state’s debt. As a prime minister, Tymoshenko could hardly find an efficient strategy to cope with the economic and financial crisis. All those factors severely undermined her credibility even among her former supporters. In contrast, being in the opposition, Yanukovych has a better position than the Tymoshenko.

If we look at the election results on the map of Ukraine, it becomes evident that the clear electoral divide of the country between the “orange” West and Center and the “blue” East and South has remained largely unchanged since the elections in 2004. There are only two differences. First, the “orange” team was represented this time by Yulia Tymoshenko instead of Viktor Yuschenko, and the second, Yanukovych managed to gain more votes in central regions of Ukraine compared to 2004, and that secured victory for him.The territorial political divide of Ukraine is hardly a positive signal. It means that none of influential Ukrainian politicians in last five years in Ukraine managed to become a genuine national leader uniting Ukraine’s East and West. However, Sergiy Tyhipko and Arseniy Yatseniuk who finished third and fourth in the first election round demonstrated nearly equal support in different regions in Ukraine. Those promising politicians can in the future become the leaders who are able to overcome the notorious Ukraine’s divide. If Viktor Yanukovych manages to recruit them in his team, he would make a wise step, since the country’s political divide remains one of the main reasons for chronic political instability in Ukraine along with flawed constitutional and electoral reforms.

As expected, Yulia Tymoshenko did not recognize her defeat in the run-off and appealed against election results in the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine. Still most political analysts agree that if successful she may be able to change the final result up to 1%, but Yanukovych is a legitimate winner of the presidential race.Before the elections, Tymoshenko threatened to take people to the streets if the elections are stolen. But she didn’t dare to stage street protests, since, in contrast to 2004, all domestic and international observers claimed that the elections were free and fair and met international standards. In particular, the election conduct was praised by the OSCE-ODIHR observation mission and the largest Ukrainian election observation NGO, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine.

If Tymoshenko decided to destabilize the situation in Ukraine claiming that she was the genuine elected President, she would have seriously undermined her image, especially after the recognition of election results by world leaders, including U.S. President, Barack Obama.  It is remarkable that for almost a week after the election date she did not make any public appearance.At the moment, the most important challenge for the newly elected President is to form a new viable coalition in the parliament. The currently existing coalition between the Our Ukraine –People’s Self-Defense Bloc, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) and the Lytvyn Bloc has less MPs e than it is needed for the majority, and lately most of the voting was situational and based on momentary  interests of different political factions. It is very likely that Yanukovych will urge upon the formation of a new coalition that is viable and loyal to him that would include Party of Regions, Communists, Lytvyn Bloc. But in order to form a majority the coalition needs to include MPs from Our Ukraine who have been perceived as official political rivals so far. If the Party of Regions fails to form such a coalition, this may lead to pre-term parliamentary elections. But taking into account the emergence of new political “tigers” such as Arseniy Yatseniuk and Sergiy Tyhypko, who both already launched their own political party projects, the new election may weaken the representation of the Party of Regions in power and, therefore, is better to be avoided by the new President.If Yanukovych manages to reformat the ruling coalition in the parliament and to put in place a new loyal prime minister, he will have much more comfortable situation than one of the President Yuschenko whose relations with the premier Tymoshenko were hostile. He will definitely have an opportunity to consolidate his power, and only time will show whether or not this will be accompanied by the attacks on democracy or not.

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Iryna Chupryna October 28th, 2008

Ukraine has become another country in Europe seriously hit by economic crisis.  The stock market has plunged by nearly 80% this year. Last week the hryvnia, the national currency, hit a seven-year low against the dollar. This is very threatening for the economy, since many credits were taken in hard currency (dollars) and, therefore, it will be increasingly hard to pay them off both for businesses and individuals.

The sixth-largest bank, Prominvestbank, was nationalized to be saved from bankruptcy. The bank system has also come under threat, after in October the panicking population took deposits worth 20 billion hryvnas (around 3.5 billion dollars) out of banks.

Furthermore, the demand on steel making up a lion’s share of Ukraine’s export has recently drastically fallen worldwide. Therefore, steel and metal industries face large job cuts which might seriously aggravate the economic situation in the industrial backbone of Ukraine – the East. An expert of the International Center of Strategic Studies based in Ukraine Ildar Gazizulin claims that due to the financial crisis, unemployment in Ukraine may raise up to 8%. Employees in metallurgy, construction and banks will be most affected.

The IMF is ready to provide a huge loan package of USD 16.5 billion to ease the effects of the global financial crisis. However, the condition is that Ukraine’s parliament approves a package of  measures aimed at tackling the crisis. Yet the politicians don’t show a willingness to compromise – representatives of the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko are blockading parliamentary proceedings again, protesting against the bill to finance early parliamentary elections. Competing packages of financial measures have been drawn up and it is not clear which of them is to be passed.

Meanwhile trust in all current leaders of Ukraine has drastically fallen. According to the latest sociological polling, the rating of the President Viktor Yuschenko has plunged down to a stunningly small figure – 4.1 %! But the ratings of his main potential rivals at the presidential elections next year have also slumped – Viktor Yanukovych is supported by 18.8 %, Yulia Tymoshenko – by 16.7 %. It is important that almost one third of voters is disappointed in all current leaders  - 20.9% admitted they would not go to presidential poll if it took place now, and 16.2% are undefined. It is clear that the demand for a new political elite is higher than ever. It might happen that the economic recession and quickly deteriorating living standards of Ukrainians will sweep off all major politicians of today – both the leaders of the Orange Revolution and their rivals. And who’s to come next?

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Iryna Chupryna October 9th, 2008

Yesterday President Viktor Yuschenko of Ukraine has announced the dissolution of the parliament and third general election in less than three years in a pre-recorded speech on TV. The polls are going to be held on 7 December.

Accusing Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuschenko said that “I am convinced, deeply convinced that the democratic coalition was ruined by one thing alone - human ambition. The ambition of one person. Thirst for power, different values, personal interests taking precedence over national interests.”  He also talked of “external threats”. The Tymoshenko Bloc, President Yuschenko said, had become “the hostage of its own leaders who would sacrifice everything - language, security, European prospects”.

On one hand, Yuschenko’s move should be hailed since the parliament showed itself as extremely ineffective institution, remembered by constant political rows, blocking, and delays in adopting crucially important laws. But, on the other hand, the clear winner of the forthcoming elections will be the opposition Party of Regions, since the forces close to Yuschenko and Tymoshenko pledged to create an effective democratic coalition, but failed. By watching their constant internal strife the Party of Regions only gained political dividends, while the “orange” parties’ ratings plummeted. Soaring inflation and unclear stand on Russian-Georgian war will probably lead to the serious political losses of the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) in the Western Ukraine. The pro-presidential Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense bloc also dissapointed voters with internal splittures - some of its deputies started to shift towards the BYuT, others joined a new Yediniy Tsentr party loyal to the Party of Regions.

The snap election is also likely to bring forward new political projects. One of them probably would come from the former speaker Arseniy Yatseniuk, another is likely to emerge around the former Defense Minister, and now ardent critic of both Yuschenko and Tymoshenko, Anatoliy Gritsenko. Radical nationalist party Svoboda led by Oleh Tiagnibok, which constantly failed in recent elections, also has a chance to overcome a 3% barrier. But there is no doubt that the ruling role in the new parliament will be played by the Party of Regions, which will probably make a configuration either with communist or/and other smaller political projects.

Alas, it was much easier to achieve a democratic breakthrough than to consolidate democracy in this large, sharply divided along social, cultural, language lines eastern European country. First, most of the so-called new political leaders have a clearly old pattern of thinking - i.e. how to win next election rather than have a long-term development program for a state, reforms in economics, public policy system, anticorruption struggle, to mention only a few. It’s not surprising because most of the present political leaders made their careers during the Kuchma’s regime, including Tymoshenko, Yuschenko and Litvin. It is extremely hard for new politicians to enter the political scene, since election lists are formed by party leadership, and it is rumored that places in the upper part of lists cost several million dollars. The situation is aggravated through the fact Ukrainian authorities failed to conduct at least a moral, much less a judicial reckoning for the crimes of Kuchma’s regime, and many people meddled in election fraud in 2004, such as Viktor Yanukovych, Sergiy Kivalov, Andriy Kluyev, are among the Party of Regions leaders. Second, populism and void promises were typical for recent electoral campaigns and they will remain unpunished, since accountability mechanisms in the system of closed party lists are absent.

Last but not least, new elections will negatively affect Ukraine’s prospects of getting MAP at the next NATO summit, and also complicate the country’s European perspective. It’s not a good timing for instability in the conditions of the world economic crisis either.

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Iryna Chupryna October 5th, 2008

The EU-Ukraine summit in September became another defeat of Ukraine’s democracy, after the April NATO Summit in Bucharest. This summit failed to give Ukraine any clear perspective, even in the remote future. While Ukraine expected to conclude an association agreement already this year, this issue was postponed for a year. It has been rumoured that recent political turmoil in Ukraine, namely the collapse of the ruling coalition and the threat of another snap parliamentary election, contributed to the EU’s reluctance to open a door for Ukraine. But the EU fails to realize that it has enough leverage to help Ukraine on its hard way on the consolidation of democracy. Namely, in contrast to NATO integration of Ukraine, which is supported less by the half of Ukrainians, the idea of European integration is supported by a majority. So the European Union has a strong potential of unifying Ukraine, providing the unity of purpose for policy. The passive attitude of the EU to Ukraine might backfire with the setback of democracy and the growth of  Russian influence in that Eastern European state.

After the collapse of the ruling coalition in early September the situation in Ukraine remains unsettled. Even if it manages to return to the previous coalition format and to avoid new elections, the coalition between the Our Ukraine and BYuT would be very fragile, with a very slight majority over the opposition. The fact is that Ukraine is a divided country in linguistic, cultural, and socio-political aspects. It looks like the way out of the impasse for Ukraine would be a pan-Ukrainian coalition uniting pragmatic politicians of both pro-Russian and pro-Western political forces who would put aside divisive issues and focus on the economy, public administration, the fight against corruption and similar issues. A number of politicians such as Yatseniuk, Yekhanurov, Grytsenko hopefully will be able to push through a political project of that type. Arseniy Yatseniuk, parliament’s speaker, has already announced his plans to launch a new political project.

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Kurt Bassuener September 23rd, 2008

Iryna Chupryna wrote an insightful analysis of the political situation on Ukraine as an issue of DPC Analyst, posted today.  The collapse of the “Orange” coalition of President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko seems destined to lead to new parliamentary elections - the third in three years, as Iryna noted.  Ukrainian voters, especially those who had high hopes from the victory of December 2004, are beginning to despair; many are tuning out of politics altogether.  Given the fact that the election results will probably not deliver a fundamental change to political order, but merely reshuffle the existing deck, it is easy to sympathize with their frustration.  Only Ukrainians, primarily in the east and south of the country, who voted for the Party of Regions, headed by Viktor Yanukovych, do not feel disappointed or let down by their leaders, and they form the largest single bloc.  Given the fact that Yanukovych not only conspired with President Kuchma and his chief of staff Viktor Medvedchuk (with considerable assistance from Vladimir Putin and now-President Dmitri Medvedev) to steal the 2004 election, this is a nearly incomprehensible result.  But it is nonetheless true.  What was won in the cold streets of Kyiv’s Maidan in November and December seems to have been mortally wounded through infighting, ego battles, and and unwillingness to put the public interest first.

No one side in the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko conflict is solely guilty.  My own view is to have more disappointment in Yushchenko, since I expected better from him, while Yulia Tymoshenko’s brand of populism proved to be a double-edged sword, but a known one throughout.  The pairing was absolutely essential during the presidential campaign after Yushchenko was poisoned, with Tymoshenko taking on the heavy travel schedule that the Yushchenko campaign planned to circumvent the media blockade against it until Yushchenko could return.  Tymoshenko was also very insistent on the monitoring the vote count.  She was a crowd-pleaser on the Maidan, and judging from the reception on New Year’s 2005 (where Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who once studied in Kyiv and speaks fluent Ukrainian, also spoke) at the Maidan, the bigger star. 

The coalition was difficult from the start, given so many egos and interests to balance.  Even from Spring 2005, it appeared that Yushchenko didn’t have a strong enough grip on his administration and government.  And it went downhill from there.

What didn’t happen, but must if Ukraine is to prosper and progress toward integration with the EU (a door which still remains closed for the moment, unfortunately - the EU has enormous capacity to use conditions for membership to spur the necessary reforms to Ukraine’s still sclerotic governance and administration) is some effort to bridge the east-west divide in Ukrainian politics.  This divide began to be ameliorated during Kuchma’s presidency, and the great perversity of his attempt to retain power vicariously was that he was willing to scuttle his greatest achievment as president for a decade - an otherwise increasingly corrupt and sordid reign.  Nonetheless, due to the combined factors of incoherence in the ruling coalition, the fact that the Party of Regions is still led by the polarizing Viktor Yanukovych, an increasingly polarized international political situation and a lack of EU strategy toward Ukraine, the country remains split essentially along the lines of the 2004 election.

There was talk when I was in Ukraine a year ago, before parliamentary elections, that sub rosa efforts were ongoing to hive off the main body of the Party of Regions under Donetsk-based tycoon Rinat Akhmetov, and then forging a Our Ukraine coalition with this party, leaving a rump PoR and the Tymoshenko Bloc out of power.  Odd as it sounds, many “Orange” veterans were in favor of such a coalition, for only an easterner could sell NATO membership the the south and east, but generally for the potential to knit the country back together behind a common agenda to pursue EU membership.

It remains to be seen what that United Center party will accomplish, but it is hard to see a way out of the current impasse without new players and new ideas.

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admin September 22nd, 2008

DPC Senior Associate Iryna Chupryna has written the second issue of “DPC Analyst”, our occasional series of longer analytical pieces.  In “The Ruling Coalition in Ukraine is Dead… What Next?” [PDF], Chupryna argues that Ukrainian political stability requires a new political consensus - one less polarized along regional lines.

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Kurt Bassuener September 10th, 2008

In an excellent op-ed in Monday’s Financial Times, the Center for European Reform’s Tomas Valasek wrote that the EU should end Ukraine’s limbo on the Union’s periphery, and finally open the door for eventual EU membership:

At the summit, the EU should begin to restore its influence in eastern Europe by putting Ukraine on a track to accession. The EU should call its new partnership deal with Ukraine an “association agreement” – this would echo past arrangements with the now-new member states of central Europe. The EU should also say that it wants closer relations with Ukraine. This would tell the Ukrainians that they are not destined to be eternal neighbours, and will be welcome to join the EU once they meet the accession criteria.

British Foreign Secretary David Milband had made his view clear that this was the course he favored:

Britain is among those backing eventual Ukrainian membership. “It is important that Europe’s leaders make clear that we are determined on a long-term relationship with Ukraine with membership as a long-term goal,” David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, said at the weekend.

Unfortunately, at the Ukraine-EU summit today in Paris, where Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko met French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy, the EU took Valasek’s advice about the “association agreement,” which was the opening step toward membership of the Central and East European members of the EU, but without openly stating that membership is the goal.  Ukraine’s ongoing political instability among erstwhile “orange” allies, but now bitter rivals for the presidency in elections next year, certainly contributed to this.  But one suspects that the real reasons are Ukraine’s size and fear of Russian resistance.  Sarkozy hinted at the resistance from Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands:

“It is the maximum that we could do, and I believe that it is already an essential step,” Mr Sarkozy said.

Mr Sarkozy emphasised that the accord was a recognised first step for countries with aspirations of EU membership.

Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko recognised the difficult timing of the summit and welcomed the association agreement as a successful outcome.

“We understand very well the conditions of this dialogue at present. This isn’t the best time, given the situation in the region but we’re patient,” he said.

 Another report from The Times gave the following Ukrainian reactions:

President Yushchenko called the agreement an historic step by the EU, which would likely end in membership. “It is the first step in a long road that was taken in the 1990s by all the [Eastern] states which have since become members,” he said.

Other Ukrainian officials voiced disappointment. Andriy Veselovsky, the Kiev Ambassador to the EU, said: “At this point the European Union is not ready to give what we want, because the European Union did not acquire a concerted position.”

The Financial Times reports today: 

“Be clear that this agreement shuts no door, and maybe it opens some doors. This is the most we could offer, but I believe it to be a substantial step,” Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, told reporters.

Diplomats said Germany and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Belgium, were the most reluctant to state clearly that Ukraine could one day join the EU.

The three Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden and the UK all sympathised with Kiev’s aspirations while recognising that accession was not an immediate possibility.

To Sarkozy’s credit, he made clear his view that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is “non-negotiable,” but it is hard to see how that can be too reassuring, given the negotiations he just returned from with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Georgia’s territorial integrity.  

The pity is that EU membership, unlike that of NATO, is not controversial even among eastern and southern Ukrainians.  Most citizens see the potential benefits of membership, not least the eastern oligarchs who recognize the importance of EU markets for their steel and other products.  Chalk up another lost opportunity for the EU to help encourage Ukraine’s politicians to cohere behind a sold program to meet European standards, so as to attain membership.  Without that incentive, the persistent infighting that has squandered much of the hope generated in the Orange Revolution will no doubt continue to degenerate - and at a very dangerous time for the country.  An open door policy for the neighborhood, combined with technical assistant in meeting the EU standards for candidacy and membership, would be a far sounder policy for the EU and the countries on its eastern frontier.

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Kurt Bassuener August 15th, 2008

US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and French President Nicolas Sarkozy met to discuss the tense situation and continuing violence in Georgia, and Dr Rice has since travelled to Georgia to meet with President Saakashvili.  She aims to get him to sign a ceasefire deal that was negotiated in shuttle diplomacy by President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, between Saakashvili and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.  The major tenets of the deal remain as they were some days ago - end to all fighting and military action, mutual withdrawal to pre-conflict positions, full humanitarian access, and international talks on the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Sarkozy said the deal would be integral to a UN Security Council resolution France would table.

President Saakashvili has concerns about the deal, since he believes it could undermine Gerogia’s territorial integrity.  On their visit to the region, the leaders of Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states also expressed their misgivings on that score.

“We feel that, in the documents presented last night both in Moscow and in Tbilisi, the principal element, the respect of the territorial integrity of Georgia, is missing,” Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus said, reading a joint statement alongside the leaders of Poland, Latvia and Estonia.

The statement underlined their “full support for the territorial integrity of Georgia within internationally-recognised borders.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave ample reason for worry yesterday when he said: “One can forget about any talk about Georgia’s territorial integrity because, I believe, it is impossible to persuade South Ossetia and Abkhazia to agree with the logic that they can be forced back into the Georgian state.”  For those that might remember, this is another conscious parallel adopted by Russia to the Western reaction to Kosovo in this conflict - first in justifying the war itself, and now in justifying the separation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia.  While there are numerous differences between these cases, Russia will use Kosovo as a rhetorical shield for its current actions in Georgia, deep into the country’s interior.  President Medvedev met with the leaders of the two breakaway regions yesterday in Moscow, to get their signatures on the ceasefire deal.  At the meeting, Medvedev told the leaders, South Ossetia’s Eduard Kokoity and Abkhaz Sergei Bagapsh, that Russia would support their independence aspirations, though ostensibly in line with the Helsinki Final Act, which insists all changes to borders be consensual:

“I’d like you to know,” Medvedev told the two leaders, “that we support any decision taken by the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We will not only support them, but guarantee them in the Caucasus and in the whole world … Right is on your side.”

It also appears that Russian forces intend to stay in both regions as “peacekeepers” for the foreseeable future - which is hardly consonant with the deal’s stipulation that forces withdraw to prewar positions. 

US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in a press conference yesterday that US-Russia relations “could be adversely affected for years to come” if Russia “does not step back from its aggressive posture and actions in Georgia.”  A long excerpt from the press conference ran on PBS’ NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, followed by a worthy discussion including Heritage’s Ariel Cohen, who I think captured the gravity for the neighborhood of the Russian action.  The US now landing flights of humanitarian assistance in Tbilisi, though Russia’s deputy military chief cast doubt on whether the aid was strictly humanitarian.  Clearly, the US involvement is chafing Russia, and Al Jazeera’s Jonah Hull speculated that the armored feint from Gori toward Tbilisi might have been motivated by this.

Meanwhile, Poland signed a hard-negotiated deal with the US to allow deployment of missile defense interceptors, in exchange for US military assistance and bilateral guarantees.  Foreign Minister Radislaw Sikorski said the timing of the deal had nothing to do with what was happening in Georgia.  Yet Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s remarks at the announcement certainly referenced current events, and expressed doubts about NATO’s Article 5 guarantees for members.

“Poland and the Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later — it is no good when assistance comes to dead people,” Tusk said. “Poland wants to be in alliances where assistance comes in the very first hours of — knock on wood — any possible conflict.

“This is a step toward real security for Poland in the future.”

A number of new NATO allies have expressed dismay at what they see as a feeble reaction to the Russian attack on Georgia.  Though it must be noted Georgia is not a NATO member, these countries - especially Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - strongly pushed Georgian membership and feel Russian pressures most acutely.

The most imeediate threat, however, is probably felt by Ukraine, which has approved a presidential order to control the deployment of Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels from the Crimean port of Sevastopol and their return - a move Russia scoffed at immediately.  The current arrangement, under which Russia can use the base, expires in 2017.  President Viktor Yushchenko has unambiguously supported Georgia and its leader Saakashvili, who was very supportive during Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution.

Russian nationalists have long decried what they see as the historical injustice of Crimea being made part of Ukraine, and some, like Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, called for its return, and was barred from entering the country as a result.  Luzhkov, some may recall, acted as Putin’s hatchet man in late 2004, when he spoke a conference of eastern and southern Ukrainian local leaders disaffected by the Orange Revolution and pushing for “autonomy,” or even separation from Ukraine.  This was quickly quashed, and there was little appetite among Russophone Ukrainians for such a move.  Crimea, however, is probably the only place in Ukraine with a large concentration of citizens who feel Russian.  Luzhkov’s moves in the future on this issue deserve close scrutiny, for he has acted in a provocative way for the Kremlin in the past.

Presidents Yushchenko and Bush spoke yesterday about Georgia, and Bush thanked Yushchenko for his role.  No doubt Ukraine wants as much insurance as it can get for its territorial integrity and independence.  The question is, will the US and European Union rise to the occasion? 

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Eric Witte August 11th, 2008

Proposals for stronger western action to defend Georgia from Russia’s invasion have tended to be short on specifics.  For example, Bill Kristol asks in yesterday’s New York Times:

Shouldn’t we therefore now insist that normal relations with Russia are impossible as long as the aggression continues, strongly reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and offer emergency military aid to Georgia?

The first proposal is a given - as long as the attack continues, western relations with Russia will be anything but normal.  That seems like weak motivation for Putin to call an end to the war while such tantalizing goals remain within his grasp. 

The second action is only a verbal commitment absent other actions.  As I wrote earlier, at least with regard to Ukraine, it could actually be helpful in defining its sovereignty as a red line for the West.  But I’m not sure it does anything for Georgia at this point. 

The third proposal - emergency military aid - is more concrete when it comes to doing something to defend Georgia now, but Russia has moved swiftly and controls Georgia’s airspace.  How would emergency military aid even be delivered?  Would Georgia still have a functioning military by the time it got there?  Then, of course, there’s the question of how Russia would respond.

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