“Are We There Yet?” New DPC Policy Brief on Bosnia

Kurt Bassuener June 2nd, 2010

The international community’s collective approach toward Bosnia and Herzegovina has failed to gain any traction, as it remains based on false assumptions. The governments comprising the Peace Implementation Council’s Steering Board (PIC) have not been able to summon the will to confront the actual challenges posed by Bosnia.
 
The collective international posture lurches between frenetic diplomatic activity in search of a short-term deliverable and passivity. This has allowed Bosnian political actors with unfulfilled agendas to operate without constraint, even calling the survival of the state into question.
 
As the October general elections approach, the spectrum of possibilities, from improvement to further worsening of the situation, is wider than at any point since Dayton was signed. While fear among B-H citizens is more salient than ever recent incidents all point to the potential for both planned and spontaneous outbursts of violence.
 
Nevertheless the EU, the US and others can still exert positive influence in Bosnia this year. On how this is achieved and what can be done to create the conditions for progress in 2011 and beyond that would lead to  a self-sustaining democratic Bosnia read DPC’s new policy brief: “Are we there yet? - International impatience vs. a long-term strategy for a viable Bosnia,” authored by Senior Associates Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener.

Get your homework done: Weber/Bassuener op-ed

Kurt Bassuener November 18th, 2009

On Monday, the online journal Global Europe published an op-ed by DPC Senior Associates Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener calling for German and American leadership on Bosnia policy.  Among the recommendations was the separation of the High Representative, who has a peace enforcement role, from the EU Special Representative, who has an EU enlargement facilitation role.  The article notes the potential of Germany to lead the EU out of its current policy dead-end.

The full article can be found online here.

EV op-ed: It’s time for a Plan B in Bosnia

Kurt Bassuener October 22nd, 2009

Today’s issue of the weekly the European Voice carries an op-ed by me in which I argue that the “Butmir process” pursued for the past two weeks in Bosnia by the EU’s Swedish Presidency and the US has failed, and for a different approach: strengthening the Dayton instruments of OHR and EUFOR and extending them until Bosnia undergoes sufficient constitutional reform to obviate the need for them.  You can go to the link here for the article.  The full text is below.

It is time for a Plan B for Bosnia
 
The international approach to Bosnia needs a strategic re-think.

For more than three years, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political situation has been deteriorating. Fears have re-surfaced that the state may violently collapse. The international community, without a strategy for years, has responded irresolutely.
 
The international community has now re-engaged, at least. On 10 October and again on 20-21 October, Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister, Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for enlargement, and Jim Steinberg, the US deputy secretary of state, called most of Bosnia’s political party leaders together at Butmir, outside Sarajevo, where they outlined a ‘package’ of reforms necessary, as they sold it, for deeper Euro-Atlantic integration.
 
The effort, though, has failed. Most Bosnian party leaders rejected the package. And there has been collateral damage: Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, called for his largely Serb-populated region to have the right to a referendum on independence. The Butmir process further weakened the international community’s high representative, Valentin Inzko, who was relegated to the sidelines.

This highlights one of the core problems in the EU’s current approach: its fixation on the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The EU’s Swedish presidency and many EU states believe Bosnia is a ‘protectorate’ as long as there is an OHR, the peace implementation body created by the Dayton peace accords. They are categorical that they cannot negotiate with Bosnia on further steps toward the EU until the OHR is closed.

As a result, the aim of the ‘Butmir process’ appears to be more to close the OHR than to halt Bosnia’s downward political spiral.

This poses tactical problems: while Bildt seems willing to give anything away to achieve that end, Dodik seems unwilling to give anything.

But the bigger issue is that the real criterion for closing the OHR should be whether Bosnia can function as a state without it. The European Commission has, to its credit, gone some way toward defining the EU’s demands by enumerating constitutional reforms needed for Bosnia to gain candidate status. NATO too should clarify its requirements.

But Bosnia’s politicians have long shown little willingness to expend political capital to meet EU and NATO standards, a response conditioned by years of the international community fudging its own standards to create the illusion of progress. Those habits will be hard for both sides to break.

Now that the Butmir effort has clearly failed, the entire international approach must be re-thought. What key elements should a Plan B contain?

First, it should be made clear that Dayton’s executive instruments – the OHR and the military side of peace implementation, EUFOR – will remain in place until Bosnia has undergone deep reform. A clear, open-ended commitment would signal to Bosnia’s politicians that they cannot simply wait out the international community.

The roles of OHR and EU Special Representative should not be occupied by the same person, as is the case now. Linking these missions at the top ensures a lowest common-denominator approach, with the EU attempting to veto the use of the extensive Bonn Powers that the OHR has.

The EU and NATO should approach constitutional reform strategically, by forming an international commission tasked with identifying popularly legitimate solutions for Bosnia’s governance.

The status of state (public) and military property, included in the five objectives and two conditions set for the OHR’s closure, must also be resolved.

International judges and prosecutors should remain involved in war-crimes and organised-crime cases beyond the end of this year. The OHR should impose a three-year extension.

Finally, the West needs to develop and demonstrate a long-term common strategy. This was clearly lacking at Butmir. The fact that Bildt can have such influence shows that few member states have firm policies. A US special envoy may need to be the catalyst for any common strategy, working with EU members that share Washington’s concerns, primarily the UK and the Netherlands. They and others in the EU that back a tougher approach now need to bring Germany on board.

Kurt Bassuener is a senior associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion.

DPC on Bosnia policy vacuum

Kurt Bassuener June 9th, 2009

Following the publication of an op-ed in the New York Times by former US Ambassador to Serbia and Croatia William Montgomery that advocated partition of Bosnia and Kosovo, DPC Senior Associate Kurt Bassuener was invited by Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje to comment.  The following article appeared in the paper’s June 9 edition.  This is the original English language version.

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Dangerous Policy Vacuum Leaves Space for Unfulfilled Agendas

By Kurt Bassuener

Last Friday, William Montgomery, former US Ambassador to Croatia and Serbia, advocated in the New York Times an “achievable” US policy toward Kosovo and Bosnia: partitioning them along ethnic lines.  This is essentially what Dobrica ?osi? and other Serbian nationalist theorists have advocated for some time.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, when postwar Bosnia was stagnating, such arguments were heard more often.  It was a flawed prescription then, as it is now. Montgomery alludes to the reality that partition would be accompanied by violence when he mentions a need for “demonstrated will and readiness to use force to prevent violence along the way.”  And violence we would see, both in BiH and in Kosovo, if this policy were actively pursued.

But the global environment and the international posture in Bosnia is much different than it was in say 1998.  For this reason, Montgomery’s article could not have come at a better time for those who wish to present BiH as an “impossible country.”  The faux simplicity of Ambassador Montgomery’s proposal is what makes it dangerously seductive to those who simply wish to be done with it. 

Bosnia and Hercegovina is far from a lost cause.  But arriving at a system that can make it work won’t be easy.  No durable solution in the country can be achieved without a consensus on what the state can be, and how it can meet popular needs for security and functioning, accountable governance. 

The current constitutional and structural system designed to maximize opacity and unaccountability.  Regardless of their varying views on the full range of issues, that is one common foundation for all members of the political cartel in BiH.  Pressing the nerves of fear and mistrust has kept them in their comfortable positions; they have little incentive to develop a functioning democratic system. 

The real question for the international community is how to ensure the necessary stability for those Bosnians who do want to make their country work to have a chance to come to accord.  This means maintaining an ability to prevent further deterioration while adopting a strategy to promote the necessary popular accommodation to arrive at a functional system.

Despite the big bang of Vice President Joe Biden’s visit and his direct statements to the BiH Parliament, there remains no clarity in international approach.  Bosnian politics went back to business as usual in days, with politicians predictably approaching Biden’s speech as a smorgasbord, picking out (and spinning) the elements they thought favorable to their positions and ignoring what they didn’t like.  There has been no follow up from Washington since.

The most likely way to catalyze a common approach is through a US presidential special envoy.  However, Biden said in an interview to this newspaper Friday that none was forthcoming.  The US remains stuck still hoping to follow an EU lead, should one materialize. None is visible on the horizon.

Only leadership by EU member states can move the Brussels bureaucracy, which thinks it has arrived at a magic formula that need only be applied.  Without any members proposing a strategy, the Brussels bureaucratic sausage machine will generate more lowest-common-denominator policies with no prospects of success. 

While the US cannot run an effective policy in Bosnia without the EU, only the US can galvanize a coherent strategy among its members.  Vague articulations of “the European path” and various process checklists are no substitute. 

There needs to be a clear articulation of what sort of Bosnia the EU will accept into the fold. The international community must commit that any such solution would have to obtain qualified majority consent of all Bosnia’s constituent peoples, as well as those “others” who are effectively second-class citizens in the Dayton system.  This will end speculation that some “Dayton II” is in the works that will impose a solution. The EU and US both need to state that will help facilitate the process by which a working consensus is reached. To make the discussion possible, the determination to maintain the guardrails that have averted implosion in Bosnia for 13 years remains essential.  That means retaining an operationally credible EUFOR and the legal platform, though not necessarily the office, of the High Representative.

The only fixation of the EU and most of its members regarding Bosnia, including the incoming Swedish presidency, is “transition” – closing the OHR and inaugurating a “reinforced” EUSR.  This is touted as an end in itself.  Aside from the amount of personnel EUSR will likely have, there is still no clarity on what this mission would actually aim to achieve.  In theory, this “reinforced” EUSR could be a positive development, if launched after full completion of 5+2 and if designed and equipped for the Bosnian reality.  Yet it seems the main goal is to divest itself of any power, and therefore responsibility should Bosnia fail. While not a policy design, the essence of Montgomery’s vision might arrive by default, with the attendant consequences.

The costs of failure – human, moral, and financial – would be massive and enduring for the EU – and the US as well.  The EU must recognize that the bill would land on its doorstep.  The reality is that the EU would have to devote far more troops than it currently fields to manage a carve-up, and it would be a far more dangerous mission for them, given that many Bosnians would see them as complicit. 

Even with a coherent strategy and the will to see it through, there is no guarantee of success.  Ultimately, if Bosnia’s citizens cannot agree on a way to make the country work, it cannot.  But under the current system, they haven’t had that chance.  Given the stakes, the international community owes Bosnia and its own taxpayers a full-bore effort to allow them that opportunity.  Once again, only American leadership can prevent a broader international failure.

Kurt Bassuener is a Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability in democracy promotion.

Unfinished Business in Bosnia: What is to be done?

Kurt Bassuener June 9th, 2009

USIPeace Briefing - Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is to be Done?

On April 3rd, DPC Senior Associates Kurt Bassuener and James Lyon attended a policy briefing on international policy toward Bosnia and Hercegovina hosted by the US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. 

In late May, USIP published a USIPeace Briefing written by Bassuener and Lyon reviewing both the proceedings and then presenting the authors’ view on what the US-EU joint strategy must be.  This paper was followed by two papers with alternate points of view on the necessary approach - also available at the link above.  Bassuener and Lyon’s briefing is available in PDF format above.

DPC op-ed in International Herald Tribune on Bosnia

Kurt Bassuener February 25th, 2009

DPC Senior Associate James Lyon penned an op-ed published in today’s International Herald Tribune on the deterioriating situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina, “Halting the downward spiral.”  In his article, he summarizes the threat:

Inexplicably, the European Union and the United States pursue policies that could all but guarantee Bosnia will revert to war. A new conflict in Bosnia could have unwanted consequences for Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, and would result not only in loss of life, destruction of property, refugee flows and the abolishment of Bosnia’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, but also would create serious rifts within NATO and destroy all pretense of EU common foreign policy. It could cause Balkan states to turn their backs on European integration and seek closer ties with Russia.

…and also the feeble international response:

In response to the escalating threat, the United States has withdrawn its general from NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, while the EU has reduced its peacekeeping force (Eufor) to approximately 2,100 troops, and announced impending withdrawals of 500 more, along with the withdrawal of its only airworthy helicopters. Eufor stopped patrolling in 2007, amid complaints that its troops were bored. France, Finland, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland are all rushing for the exits.

The international community appears to be on autopilot as it rushes to close the international supervisory mission in Bosnia, the Office of the High Representative, leaving only the European Union Special Representative, with an uncertain mandate and weak powers, as the leading international presence. Many EU members seem convinced, and the U.S. appears to hope, that the transition to a weak EU special representative will create momentum and somehow motivate Bosnia’s politicians to change their behavior.

He advocates the following remedy:

Bosnia’s backward slide can be halted with few new resources, but it will take outside-the-box thinking. This will include Washington re-engaging and appointing a special presidential envoy to the Balkans, who can help the Western alliance focus policies and deliver consistent messages. It also requires a robust office of the EU special representative and that the EU take the threat seriously and make Eufor a capable deterrent. Most of all, it requires a long-term commitment to state-building in Bosnia. Too much has been invested and too much is at stake to continue with current policies.

In the same issue of the Herald Tribune, NY Times reporter Dan Bilefsky reports on the fallout from a criminal investigation launched against Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik:

 Dodik expressed indignation over the weekend, saying he was the victim of a witch hunt aimed at undermining him and the Bosnian Serb Republic. “Even the little faith I had in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is now lost due to this farce with the criminal charges against me,” he said Saturday. “They have made this country pointless.”…

Dodik also vented his ire at a meeting Saturday in Mostar, where leaders of Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups were discussing how to press forward with changes to the constitution. Attendees at the meeting said Dodik stormed out after one hour. Before leaving, they said, he delivered an ultimatum that a new constitution could only proceed if it affirmed the right of the Bosnian Serb Republic to national self-determination and enshrined its right to hold a referendum on independence.

He also quoted Bosnian political analyst Srecko Latal:

“The United States and the European Union must engage, not just for the sake of Bosnia, but because the world can’t afford to allow what happened the last time,” Latal said in an interview. While Bosnia is patrolled by a 2,000-strong EU peacekeeping force, he said it was not strong enough if hostilities erupted.

New DPC Policy Brief - How to Pull-Out of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Dead-End

Kurt Bassuener February 20th, 2009

DPC Policy Brief - How to Pull-Out of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Dead-End calls for strong leadership of and tools for the “reinforced” European Union Special Representative (EUSR) mission to follow closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  The brief notes the rising climate of fear and uncertainty in the country must be arrested by the international community to stop the slide toward conflict.  The paper also argues that only by confronting the constitutional reform issue can the EU assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in meeting EU standards.

 To the EU:
1) Appoint a politically capable leader as High Representative/EUSR.
2) Articulate clear constitutional reform guidelines and make constitutional reform the core of the EUSR mandate.
3) Give the EUSR executive authority to confront anti-Dayton activity.
4) Ensure that EUFOR has credible operational capacity throughout the country to deter and respond to threats to public security and the Dayton Peace Accords.
5) Authorize the EUSR to decide on fulfilment of EU conditions and all sanctions.
6) Ensure EUSR possesses anti-organized crime and corruption investigative capacity.
7) Maintain a broad international coalition in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To the Peace Implementation Council:
8) Insist on full completion of the 5+2 formula prior to closing OHR.

To the US:
9) Appoint a Presidential Special Envoy to the Balkans to demonstrate US engagement and promote international policy cohesion.
10) Post a US flag officer in the NATO HQ Sarajevo to identify training and exercise opportunities.

New DPC Policy Brief - Rethinking US Policy toward the Western Balkans

Kurt Bassuener February 17th, 2009

DPC Senior Associate James Lyon has written a Policy Brief on the still unstable situation in the Western Balkans, and the need for re-engagement by the Unitied States through a Presidential Special Envoy.  A brief description of the policy brief is below, with a link to the full paper:

Euro-Atlantic policies towards the Western Balkans have reached the limits of their effectiveness, as countries throughout the region have hit a brick wall in the reform and European integration process. It is time to examine the effectiveness of the western alliance’s policy approach towards the Western Balkans and adjust it to meet new realities.This paper examines the challenges facing the western alliance in the Balkans, the limits of international influence under current policy, and the options available to enhance progress in the region. It offers five policy recommendations that will, if implemented, substantially alter the policy dynamic and assist the Euro-Atlantic alliance to stabilize the region and move it forward in the European accession process without substantial new resources. It also argues that little progress will occur in the region until the United States resumes its leadership role.Recommendations:

  1. The United States (US) needs to re-engage diplomatically in the region by appointing a Special Presidential Envoy to the Balkans.
  2. The practice of “dual-hatting” European Union Special Representatives with functions of non-EU missions should cease, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  3. The US and European Union (EU) should resist the temptation to further draw down troop levels either in Kosovo or Bosnia, and the US should reinsert a flag-level officer in NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.
  4. Both the EU and US should treat all countries equally, stop giving Serbia preferential treatment and refuse to lower standards, especially regarding corruption.
  5. The EU and US should engage on assuring energy security to the region, by expediting the Nabucco pipeline and including a spur into the Western Balkans.

The full brief is available in PDF at the link below:

DPC Policy Brief - Rethinking US Policy toward the Western Balkans